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Democracies and dictatorships in Africa : 2018 in review and prospects for 2019

28 février 2019

Democracies and dictatorships in Africa : 2018 in review and prospects for 2019

New wave of non-democratic elections in 2018 after that of 2016 :
on a continental scale, dictatorships is taking over,
and the gap between Anglophone and Francophone Africa is widening.

Régis Marzin, journalist and independent researcher, Twitter : @Regis_Marzin

13 february 2019

English version in Format PDF (28.2.19)

This is an English translation of the original study.

In case of a discrepancy the French original text shall prevail.

French version Html or Format PDF (28.2.19)

Slide show of the graphs and map of this study (in french version)

Update of the main charts and maps

following studies of 2016, 2017, 2018 (3 French versions)

30 march 2016 : ‘After 26 years of democratization, dictatorship and democracy soon to be balanced in Africa’

27 april 2017 : ‘2016 : Year of electoral coups in Africa, democratization of Africa since 1990

14 january 2018 : ‘Democracy and dictatorships in Africa: 2017 in review 2017 and prospects for 2018,
2017 an additional year to the continental balance

 

Summary

Introduction. 3

  1. 2018 in review : changes in the nature of political regimes. 4

1.1 Change of regimes ans type of regime in 2018. 4

1.2 Regime type change and number of alternations since 1990. 6

1.3 Confirmed trend of an increase in the number of political party dictatorships. 8

1.4 Evolution of the ranking of regimes in Africa from 1990 to 2018 (55 countries) 8

1.5 Evolution of the ranking of regimes in Africa from 1990 to 2018 and intermediate regimes (Tcii) 10

1.6 In terms of democratization, a widening gap between Anglophone and Francophone Africa. 12

1.61 2018, the year of a new stall of the former French colonies. 12

1.62 Limitation of the number of presidential terms in the constitutions according to colonization. 13

1.7 Map of Africa of political regimes, democracies and dictatorships in 2018. 14

  1. The electoral process in 2018: dictatorships occupy the ground. 15

2.1 Election report for the year 2018. 15

2.2 Forecast of the quality of electoral processes according to the nature of the regimes. 19

2.3 Alternations in 2018 and hard core dictatorships without alternation. 21

2.4 Elections in dictatorship : paroxysm of the inversions of presidential results. 23

2.5 Evolution of the quality of electoral processes from 1990 to 2018. 25

  1. Prospects for 2019 : electoral peak (30) and record of democracy since 1990. 27

3.1 Calendar : 2019 exceptional year for democracy in Africa. 27

3.2 Predicting the quality of electoral Processes in 2019 by type of regime in 2018 (and 2019) 28

3.3 Elections in Africa in 2019 : concentration of difficulties in the former French colonies. 31

Conclusion. 32

NOTES. 33

  1. History 2018: election year 33
  2. Forecasts 2019 : election year (at 12.2.19) 37
  3. Reminder : provisional calendar of the elections of the study of 14.1.18. 42

This is an English translation of the original study.

In case of a discrepancy the French original text shall prevail.

Introduction

 

At the beginning of 2018, for the last three years, the African continent has been equilibrium between established democracies and stable dictatorships: 22 and 22 in 2015, 23 and 23 in 2016, 22 and 22 in 2017. The four inversions of presidential result of 2016 had impressed by their violence, at this stage of balance. The year 2018 was not as prominent at the presidential level, but many electoral crises in dictatorships were predictable due to an agenda of 8 legislative elections in non-democratic regime.

Several democratic regimes considered relatively strong degenerated into 2018. If the positive surprise came from Ethiopia, once again no undemocratic regime was stopped. As in 2017, the trend has remained in the transformation of dictatorship of leader to dictatorship of political party with alternation of chief executive.

About electoral processes, a year ago, it was possible to say that « the effect of the inversions of results crystallized, solidified under a new layer of diplomatic polish » and that « the taboo was established durably on the inversions of results ». The effect was felt during the elections in the DRC, where the international community remained paralyzed, stunned, faced with an inversion of results, in its unpredictable way, because itw as made in favor of a candidate of the opposition returned by the system in place. A very ephemeral disorder has even been felt up to the African Union, which until then had remained inflexible in the face of the claims of democrats victims of diversion of electoral processes, whether upstream or by inversion of the result.

If in 2017, a debate on the quality of electoral processes took place because of several conflicts in countries already relatively democratized and English speaking, in Kenya and Liberia, this debate has almost disappeared at the international and African level in 2018. The legislative elections were considered as secondary, which shows the weakness of support for the process of African democratization in the time of Trump, Putin, Macron and Gutteres.

The summary of the year in terms of regimes and electoral processes is very negative. Concerning the ranking of regimes, the continental process of democratization has declined over a year as it has rarely decreased, mainly because of the fall of the rule of law in previously intermediate regimes or fragile democracies, which corresponds less and less at election news. In some cases, the choice of leaders being electorally impossible, a mobilization is followed by a repression. The period of hopes of a rapid shift of the African balance in favor of democracies is over. The only positive observation, that of the multiplication of changes of personalities at the head of the executives is unfortunately offset by the increase of the number of regimes in dictatorship of political party with alternation of the head of the executive.

 

1.     2018 in review : changes in the nature of political regimes

1.1 Change of regimes ans type of regime in 2018

 

Methodological reminder : « The classification of the regimes resulting from the March 30, 2016 study distinguishes 3 categories : « Stable Dictatorship, Transition to Democracy, Complex, Intermediate and Indeterminate (TCII), Democracy. The main criteria for ranking the regimes are how to come to power and how to retain power, and there are other criteria. The category ‘Democratic, Complex, Intermediate and Indeterminate Transition (TCII)’ is also the category of all regimes that are not stable Dictators or Democracies. »

 

In this ranking, in 2018, 8 countries have changed category, positively, Ethiopia and Gambia, negatively, Guinea, Morocco, the DRC, Comoros, Benin, and Niger.

 

Change State Events ans changes Dates
TCII>Dict.S Guinea Accumulation of failing electoral processes during a process of transition to democracy started in 2010. Failure of this transition to democracy due to Alpha Condé and his party, the RPG, visible in the municipal conflict of 4.2.18, due to an electoral process organized in the manner of dictatorships. Voluntary maintenance of a doubt about a project to eliminate the limit of the number of mandates. Nearly 100 dead in the repression since 2011. Rapprochement with dictatorships by Alpha Condé during his presidency of the AU in 2017 and support of Faure Gnassingbé to remain through the mediation of ECOWAS in 2018 before the Togolese legislative elections. 20.12.18. 04.02.18

20.12.18

TCII>Dict.S DRC After strong government repression and instability in 2017, the organization of the most confrontational, tense and complex electoral process in African electoral history between 2016 and 2018 due to the blockages of Joseph Kabila and his party. After the elections of 30.12.18, inversion in favor of the opponent returned at the last moment, Felix Tshisekedi, inversion of the majority of the legislative election without any result compiled and reversal of majority of multiple provincials. Historic summit of electoral crime in Africa. 30.12.18
TCII>Dict.S Morocco After the strong repression of the Hirak movement in 2017, many Hirak militants were sentenced to long prison terms in 2018, including the main leader, Nasser Zefzafi, who was sentenced to 20 years in prison on 27.6.18. End of the improvement of the political regime of 2011. Maximum support by Mohammed VI of the Gabonese dictatorship through the reception of Ali Bongo 29.11.18 27.06.18

29.11.18

Dict.S>TCII Ethiopia Change of Prime Minister: Abiy Ahmed appointed by the EPRDF replaces Hailemariam Desalegn after 2 years of demonstrations on 27.3.18. New government on 16.10.18 and many positive reforms without election yet. Clear evolution towards a better state of law even if the structure of the party dictatorship of the EPRDF remains in place. 27.03.18

16.10.18

Démo>TCII

 

Comoros Process of rapid dictatorization around the change of Constitution decided by Azali Assoumani and imposed by the constitutional referendum of 29.7.18, exceptional case in the African electoral history of diversion of electoral process of referendum.

 

29.07.18
Démo>TCII Benin Elimination of the presidential contestants of 2021 by Patrice Talon. In particular, conviction on 18.10.18, to 20 years in prison of Sebastien Ajavon, in a judicial masquerade worthy of a dictatorship, after the creation of a special court, the CREIT. More than a dozen opponents are in exile including candidates, including Sebastien Ajavon of the party USL and other members of his party, and Komi Koutche of FCBE arrested in Madrid on 14.12.18 (released 17.2.19 without being extruded). New electoral law of the legislature eliminating the small parties (<10% votes). In this context, the gradual decline of the rule of law and the decline of the freedom of the press. 18.10.18

14.12.18

Démo>TCII Niger Repression of the civil society and imprisonment of associative leaders including Ali Idrissa, Moussa Tchangari, Nouhou Arzika and Me Lirwana Abdourahmane, following the organization of demonstrations in March 2018, instrumentalization of the justice and maintained abusive detention during 4 months according to method of dictatorship to break the associative actions. 25.03.18

24.07.18

TCII>Démo Gambia Stabilization in democracy after a transition to rapid democracy following the fall of Yahya Jammeh on 20.1.17, after the presidential election of 1.12.16. Successful transition noted in the legislative elections of 6.4.17 and in the policy implemented since. 01.12.16

20.01.17

06.04.17

Démo>Démo

P

Madagascar Alternation : Andry Rajoelina of the party Tanora Gasy Vonona (TGV / MAPAR) winner by 55.66% of the votes in the 2nd round on 19.12.18 replaces Hery Rajaonarimampianina as president. 07.11.18

19.12.18

Démo>Démo

P by

parlement

South Africa Election by Parliament of Cyril Ramaphosa on February 15, 2018 to the presidency after the resignation of Jacob Zuma on 14.2.18 after the threats of the ANC to dismiss him because of several cases. 14.02.18

15.02.18

Démo>Démo Botswana Inauguration of the new president, Mokgweetsi Masisi, former vice president, April 1, 2018, after a limit of 2×5 years reached by Ian Khama. It is not elected and legislative elections will take place in 2019, which will confirm or not the choice by an election of the parliament. 01.04.18
Démo>Démo

P+L

Sierra Leone Alternation of President and of President Party after the victory of Julius Maada Bio (SLPP) in the presidential elections of March 7 and 27, 2018, beginning of cohabitation with the party All People’s Congress (APC) winner of the legislative 7.3.18 07.03.18

27.03.18

Démo>Démo

L

Sao Tomé-et-Principe Alternation in Assembly and Government and cohabitation with President Evaristo Carvalho (ADI), after alliance of the Democratic Convergence Party (PCD, Delfim Neves) and the MLSTP-PSD on 22.11.18 following the legislative elections of 7.10.18. 07.10.18

22.11.18

 

In 2018, the most positive development is that of Ethiopia. The Revolutionary Democratic Front of the Ethiopian Peoples (EPRDF) designating March 27, 2018 and April 2 as Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed from the Organization Oromo Peoples Organization (OPDO), one of the four community and regional parties of the EPRDF coalition, allowed to stop a crisis due to the factual single party position of the EPRDF. The improvements affect neighboring countries, but the EPRDF may subsequently resume a single-party operation de facto incompatible with further progress in freedoms, particularly at the electoral level.

The fastest regression was that of the Comoros. On July 29, 2018, President Azali Assoumani imposed a change of constitution in a non-democratic way. The transition from a limitation to 1 term to 2 terms of 5 years maximum, allows it to remain until 2029. The 3 positions of vice-presidents are removed. The Constitutional Court is dissolved. Fraud in the boycotted constitutional referendum, including ballot stuffing, led to an original form of constitutional coup d’etat. The participation rate has been inflated, the result was invented in the manner of dictatorships. A crackdown fell on the protesters. Violence started. The presidential election has been advanced to 2019 and could confirm a rapid deterioration towards a dictatorial regime.

The majority of events that allow a posteriori to note changes in the nature of the plans were unpredictable. Few of them were directly linked to elections, arriving at a predictable date. Only the DRC has evolved according to an electoral calendar and unfortunately in the wrong direction.

The forecasts of the study of January 14, 2018 ‘Democracy and dictatorships in Africa: report 2017 and perspectives 2018’,

Change State Events et changes Dates
TCII>Démo

Very likely

Gambia End of a rapid transition to democracy after the victory of Adama Barrow (UDP) against Yahya Jammeh (APRC) in the presidential election of 1.12.16 and the exile of Yahya Jammeh on 20.1.17 after a military intervention of the ECOWAS, then to the successful legislative elections of 6.4.17 01.12.2016

20.01.2017

06.04.2017

Dict.S>TCII

Fairly likely

Togo Instability in dictatorship due to massive demonstrations from 19.8.17 against the 3rd term and the possibility of a 4th term, and the approach of legislative elections mid-2018 19.08.2017

7.2018 ?

Dict.S>TCII

Not very likely

Zimbabwe Possibility of transition to democracy in 2017 during the elections after the forced resignation by the army on 21.11.17 of Robert Mugabe in power since 31.12.87 and replacement by Emmerson Mnangagwa on 24.11.17, which will depend on the quality of the electoral process in 2018. 21.11.2017

24.11.2017

7.2018 ?

were only correct in one and a half cases out of 3: The Gambia has stabilized positively as expected. Zimbabwe has not taken the lead of a ‘transition to democracy’ but that of a ‘transformation from dictatorship of personality into party dictatorship’. This hypothesis, which was most likely, is confirmed by the repression of the beginning of 2019. On the other hand, Togo saw a burst of its dictator to stay and try to hold another 4th and 5th term. While ECOWAS should have abandoned it on the issue of limiting the number of mandates, it finally supported it by resuming its propaganda on the organization of the boycotted legislatures. As in 2005, the Cedeao is again partly responsible for maintaining the Togolese dictatorship while the share of the population following the regime has become very small.

Four out of eight changes of type of regime occurred in West Africa and five out of eight in the former French colonies. 3 out of 6 negative evolutions took place in the former French colonies of West Africa:

Colonization Region Démocratization Dictatorization
French West Benin, Niger, Guinea
South Comoros
North Morocco
Belgian Center DRC
English West Gambia
Without East Ethiopia

West Africa, which seemed to be able to move towards more complete democratization, by following the example of southern Africa, has, on the contrary, entered a phase of regression. The 3 countries concerned, Benin, Guinea and Niger, can still recover. Guinea, which is still moving away from democracy because of the bad electoral process, still retains a two-term limitation that can make an impact and end with an alternation in 2020. Alpha Condé can still remember that he fought more young for democracy. The majority of dictatorships are irreversible, but in the case of Guinea, the process seems to be still reversible.

 

1.2 Regime type change and number of alternations since 1990

 

The strong democratic regressions concern 3 countries which knew a maximum of alternations. The Comoros are 2nd out of 55 in the ranking of the highest number of alternations in Africa, Niger, 5th and Benin 6th. In the Comoros, President Azali Assoumani thought that the old constitution that caused alternations was no longer appropriate. In Benin, on the contrary, Patrice Talon is in favor of limiting the number of terms, since he has a proposed time and then abandoned to move to the single mandate. In Niger, the abusive level of repression of civil society in 2018 has nothing to do with keeping the president in office for the second and last term.
African countries having experienced the maximum alternation of chief executive and ruling party:

Number of alternations since 1990

of president (PR) and Parti

State Note
Démocracies : alternations PR = 4, parti = 1 South Africa Alternation PR in 2018 / corruption
TCII : alternations PR = 4, parti = 4 Benin Judicial attacks against opponents
Démocracies : alternations PR = 4, parti = 4 Mauritius
TCII : alternations PR = 4, parti = 5 Niger Regression of the State of law
Démocracies : alternations PR = 4, parti = 5 Sao Tome-et-Principe Alternation Ass. 2018 and cohabitation
Démocracies : alternations PR = 5, parti = 4 Madagascar Alternation PR en 2018
TCII : alternations PR = 5, parti = 5 Comoros Fast dictatorization in 2018
Démocracies : alternations PR = 5, parti = 5 Lesotho

 

Synthesis « alternation of president » and « alternation of party »: according to the type of regime of 2018

Number of countries according to number of alternations since 1990 end 2018

In terms of alternation, the cases of Benin, Comoros and Niger show a new category of countries. These 3 countries in red on the right of the chart below have in common to correspond to regressions from a democratic state that seemed stable. These regressions can probably be interpreted also as a symptom of a wider international crisis of democracy, beyond Africa, because of the movements of decline of the rule of law, the repression of the opponents, the constitutional manipulations become easier, even where democratic foundations exist. Positively, these democratic bases can allow the processes to remain reversible, until some point of recoil.

At this stage, it appears that institutions are on average stronger in English-speaking African countries. In South Africa, corruption has put democracy at risk, but counter-power, especially justice, has worked well. In Niger, the more Mamadou Issoufou argued about the independence of the judiciary, the more he was considered by many to be a liar. In addition, the more Anglophone model of constitution, of the election of the president by a parliament, favors alternations by limiting the power of the chief executive.

1.3 Confirmed trend of an increase in the number of political party dictatorships

Presidents are getting older. The number of countries with a limitation of the number of mandates continues to increase, 38 in 2018 against 37 in 2017. The number of political party dictatorships with alternation of the chief executive has long remained stable, with the 4 model countries, Algeria, Tanzania, Mozambique and Ethiopia. Increasingly, dictatorial regimes are perpetuated following changes in the executive heads. The power is then distributed on a system of actors.

Angola in 2017 has progressed at the level of liberties but the country has evolved towards a maintenance of political party without possibility of alternation. In 2018, Zimbabwe in 2018 became a sixth case. After the reversals of results in early 2019 in the DRC, the country could be a seventh country to take the same direction, if Felix Tshisekedi is absorbed by the system set up by Joseph Kabila. More generally, the limitations on the number of mandates prompt other leaders to promote a favorite minister as a successor, and the probability of seeing other political party dictatorships with alternation also exists elsewhere, for example in Mauritania. In Ivory Coast, on the other hand, the personification of power is strong and there is a growing risk that Alassane Ouattara will continue to hold power for more than two terms.

The installation in a long-term solid dictatorship can be done with progress on secondary points that do not affect the strength of the regime, which is the scenario already initiated in Angola or in Zimbabwe. This type of exchange between conceded progress and the possibility of staying a long time is perhaps already what is being put in place in the DRC. Without true multiparty politics, Ethiopia’s progress does not mean a surrender of power by the EPRDF.

 

1.4 Evolution of the ranking of regimes in Africa from 1990 to 2018 (55 countries)

 

After 3 consecutive years of equilibrium, 22/22 in 2015, 23/23 in 2016, and 22/22 in 2017, stable dictatorships (24) have regained the upper hand in 2018 on democracies (20). Peace is progressing and the number of unstable countries is decreasing. Democratic regressions in countries that have lived for years in a democracy (Benin, Niger, Comoros) for the first time disturb the equilibrium, without the appearance of a security-type instability.

 

Delta ‘Number of democracies – Number of stable dictatorships’ / previous year

Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Delta ‘N démocracies – N Dictatorship S’ / previous year 6 5 2 4 1 -1 -3 -2
N dictatorship – N democracies 38 26 21 19 15 14 15 18 20

 

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
1 4 2 2 5 -1 0 5 0 -1 -2 -1 4 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 -4
19 15 13 11 6 7 7 2 2 3 5 6 2 3 3 4 0 0 0 4

In number of dictatorships and democracies, 2018 appears here as the worst year since 1990. Never has a decline of 4 countries been recorded since 1990. However, the processes are more or less progressive and probably reversible in Benin, Niger, and Guinea. The downgrading of Guinea corresponds in fact to 8 years of failure of the transition to democracy. The events are more diffuse. In addition, this bad year follows 6 years of relative balance (Delta ‘N democracies – N Dictatures S’ / previous year at 0 or -1), and the trend for subsequent years should be to return to less dictatorial or regression of democracy.

 

Amount of population by type of regime

At the level of population, progress in Ethiopia (99.5 million inhabitants in 2016) and return to a dictatorial system in the DRC (79 Ms inhabitants in 2016) compensate each other. Morocco (33.1 Ms inhabitants in 2016) also plays. Overall, the balance does not change much, but the percentage of African population in dictatorship returns close to 50%, to 47%.

 

1.5 Evolution of the ranking of regimes in Africa from 1990 to 2018 and intermediate regimes (Tcii)

 

Classification and evolution in the classification of the regimes in 2018 with details of the regimes in Transition to democracy, Complex, Intermediate and Indeterminate (TCII).

Countries changing categories are marked in bold.

Stable

Dictatorships

24 instead of 22

+3-1

Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Cameroon, Swaziland, Uganda, Djibouti, Togo, Gabon, Angola, Egypt, Algeria, Tanzania, Mozambique, Burundi, Mauritania, Ivory Coast (2016), Rwanda (1994 following genocide, 2003 Kagame elected, 2017 3rd term), DRCongo (2018 electoral process of dictatorship), Guinea Conakry (2010 transition, 2011 Condé, 2018 failure transition / electoral process), Morocco (1999 Mohammed VI, monarchy, 2011 democratization, 2018 repression)
Transition to democracy, Complex, Intermediate and Indeterminate (TCII)

11

Instead of 11

+1,-3,+3-1

War and following war:

War (including war in failed state): Somalia (1991 war, 2000 exile parliament, 2012 Sheikh Mohamud), Libya (2011 war failed state),

Continued war in failed state (of which in democratic transition): South Sudan (2005 following war, 2010 Kiir, 2011 independence), Central African Republic (2013 following war failed state, 2014 transition, 2016 Touadéra)

NB: In 2017, these two states, South Sudan and CAR, are on the verge of active war and there is little difference between war and war.

Following war out of bankrupt state (including following independence): –

Following genocide: –

Instability of government (including following coup) and / or popular protest: Guinea Bissau (2009 instability), Kenya (2017 electoral dispute, 2018 Kabila support)

Undetermined: Somaliland (1991 unrecognized Onu, 2001 constitution, 2010 Mahamoud),

Transition from dictatorship to democracy: Ethiopia (2018 transition following protests)

Dictatorisation, fall of the rule of law: Benin (2018 opposition repression), Niger (2018 opposition repression), Comoros (2018 rapid dictatorization),

Démocracies

20 instead of 22

-3+1

Botswana, Mauritius, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Zambia, South Africa, Namibia, Malawi, Lesotho, Senegal, Nigeria, Ghana, Mali, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Seychelles, Tunisia, Madagascar, Burkina Faso (2016 ), Gambia (2018 successful transition to democracy).

 

Evolution of regimes in Africa from 1990 to 2018 with details of the intermediate regimes (Tcii)

Peace progresses, states are built. State and law are built with or without democracy. At the continental level, in 2018, the opportunity to choose its leaders and the freedom that ensues decrease.

The international community is putting its energy into ending armed conflicts in the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Somalia and Libya. The international disengagement in support of democratization was very visible in 2018 in the DRC, a test country at all levels. Following his remarkable acceptance of the outcome reversals in the DRC saying « the losers behaved positively vis-à-vis the constitutional structures », António Guterres adds on February 10, 2018, « There is a wind of hope that blows on Africa. The United Nations is committed to continuing to promote a diplomatic wave for peace. In the manner of François Hollande, he abandons a global approach ‘Peace and Security, Democracy and the Rule of Law, Economy and Development’, for the occasion of the Ua summit, to speak only peace. Hypocrisy peaks when one begins to thank a dictator for not having slaughtered people too much.

The EU, which has the best support tool through its Election Observation Missions, has also shown its disengagement in support of democracy in Gabon, as it approaches the negotiation of a new ACP-EU agreement. With the participation of the International Criminal Court, which abandoned its investigation in Gabon, the Cotonou Agreement was buried in Gabon in early 2018 in the abandonment of sanctions against Ali Bongo following the inversion of the results of 2016 and the massacre associated. For the moment, at the EU-EU level, the EU focuses on easier countries and ignores dictatorships, especially French-speaking ones, which, moreover, would no longer be calling on it.

Transitions to democracy continue to disappear. Since 2006, they have become stronger with a better chance of success, in the rarest cases where they occur, they can be shorter, in Gambia for example. If the curve ‘sum of countries transitioning to democracy and democracies’ then becomes more interesting to predict the evolution, there is only one country concerned, Ethiopia, to a certain extent because this country, where the political parties are regional, has not moved from the ‘single party in fact’.

In 2017, the number of countries with government instability increased with the DRC and Kenya adding to Guinea Bissau. In 2017 and 2018, demonstrations by the Togolese population to prevent a fourth presidential term failed to shake Faure Gnassingbe’s weak and perverse dictatorship. The situation has settled in Kenya, a country where democratic institutions remain strong alongside conflicts, without a return to democracy being certain. The population of DRC could not continue to demonstrate massively. These massive demonstrations resumed at the end of 2018 in Sudan, because of Omar El-Beshir’s plan to abolish the limitation of the number of mandates of the constitution. In this case, the wear and old age of dictatorship appears.

But the cases linked to the same wear do not multiply in Africa, because, on the contrary, in 2018, outside Sudan, the armed forces of the states manage to keep the top in the dictatorships, including in Togo where the demonstrations were prevented almost all year.

The repression has won democratic regimes like Niger. Regressions in democratic regimes without instability of government or massive demonstrations, in Comoros, Niger, and Benin, constitute the new element in 2018.

The DRC remained in 2018 as in 2016 and 2017, the country where a maximum of stakes and strengths are concentrated. The catastrophic result of the elections of 30 December 2018 is likely to have very negative consequences in Africa. In the face of the greatest scandal in African electoral history, the international community’s scorn, helplessness, and malaise were never felt so much as when the ‘sad joke’ of the election of Felix Tshisekedi had to be accepted, knowing his estimate of actual number of votes around 17%.

The diplomatic trend is to highlight the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity in favor of Ua whatever the price to pay in renouncing democratic principles. In reality, the acceptance and lack of reaction in 2016 on the series of inversion of the results of the presidential elections of Congo Brazzaville, Djibouti, Chad and Gabon has weighed in the defeat of democracy in the DRC in 2018, among other things, because other factors played, including the arrival of Donald Trump at the White House.

 

1.6 In terms of democratization, a widening gap between Anglophone and Francophone Africa

1.61 2018, the year of a new stall of the former French colonies

Stable dictatorship by colonization from 1988 to 2018

Since the creation of South Sudan, there have been 20 former British colonies and 20 former British colonies (without Namibia colonized by South Africa). A vague impression of delay of the French-speaking space remained since the 90s and the great era of the Françafrique of Chirac. The persistence of English dictatorships sometimes disturbed perception. Objective data, however, confirm the evolution of the gap over time. In the 90s, democratization was faster on the English side, but this democratization stopped in 2005 because of the resistance of the toughest English-speaking dictatorships. In 2015, the delay of the former French colonies in number of dictatorships was almost caught up. In 2018, because of Guinea and Morocco, the gap is recreating. In 2018, the former French colonies have almost twice as many stable dictatorships as the former British colonies, 11 against 5.

Democracies by colonization from 1988 to 2018

In 2018, the former British colonies also include almost twice as many democracies as the former French colonies, 11 against 5. The gap has widened in both directions. In 2018, all the major setbacks occurred in former French colonies (5: Guinea, Morocco, Comoros, Benin, Niger) or Belgium (1: DRC). All progress has taken place in former Italian colonies (1: Ethiopia) or English colonies (1: Gambia). Apart from changes in the type of regime, other progress is taking place outside the Francophone area, in Angola and perhaps at the end of 2018 in Sudan, if Omar El-Beshir is prevented by the people from removing the limitation of the number of mandates. On the francophone side, the only positive touch of the year could be the fact that Ould Abdel Aziz agrees to respect the constitution and to leave in 2020, if one accepts to be almost surprised when a constitution is respected.

1.62 Limitation of the number of presidential terms in the constitutions according to colonization

Anglophone and Francophone spaces in Africa do not have the same understanding of what a constitution is. Reforms and changes of constitutions for personal interests are common in the French-speaking world, whereas they are rarer in the English-speaking world.

In 2018, there was only one change concerning the number of mandates : in Chad, Idriss Déby conceded a limit of 2 times 6 years by passing the mandate from 5 to 6 years and imposing without any debate a zeroing of its mandate counter. At this date, the number of French colonies with a limit of the number of mandates has joined that of the former British colonies : 14. Since 2004, there are not many differences. The limits of the number of warrants were set up faster in all the former French colonies in the 1990s, with the exception of the monarchy of Morocco, in 19 countries between 1988 and 2001, but in this period democratization has was faster in the English-speaking world. The essential is in the electoral processes. The wave of deletion of 9 limitations between 2001 and 2009 (7 visible on the graph + 2 compensated by 2 late arrivals to the Comoros and Senegal in 2001) is for many in the maintenance of dictatorships until 2018.

As the respect of constitutional texts is stronger on the English side, the respect of the agreements on the electoral processes is on average also. Since 1990, almost all the French leaders have consistently favored military relations or exchanges in the UN and neglected support for the construction of truly democratic institutions or the establishment of indisputable electoral processes. The current period is beginning to be impacted by the European Brexit, but its effects in Africa are still difficult to perceive. The gap widened in 2018 and the years to come will confirm this trend or not.

 

1.7 Map of Africa of political regimes, democracies and dictatorships in 2018

 

To understand this map, see also on the blog R * E

the slide show of the evolution of the regimes from 1989 to 2018[1]

This map, which uses the data in paragraph 1.1, is contrasted with the map of 2017 in the study of January 14, 2018[2] and before with the last map of the series from 1990 to 2016 in the study of April 27, 2017[3].

 

2.     The electoral process in 2018: dictatorships occupy the ground

2.1 Election report for the year 2018

 

This review is based mainly on the 10 legislative and 8 presidential (including one by a parliament) of 2018. But other elections were held : 10 local, 4 regional, 4 senatorial, 2 constitutional referendums.

 

In 2018 Africa experienced a peak of local elections with 10 local, municipal or municipal and 4 regional (see study of 18.10.17: ‘2018: year of local elections in Africa?‘):
February 4, 2018: local / communal Guinea
March 7, 2018: Local Sierra Leone
April 12 (and May 12) 2018: local Gambia
May 6, 2018: local / city Tunisia
July 30, 2018: local Zimbabwe
1st and 15th September 2018: local / municipal Mauritania
October 7, 2018: local / municipal Sao Tome and Principe
October 10, 2018: local / city Mozambique
October 13, 2018: local / city Ivory Coast
October 6 and 27, 2018: local Gabon
… and 4 regional:
1st and 15th of September 2018: regional Mauritania
October 7, 2018: regional Sao Tome and Principe
October 13, 2018: regional Ivory Coast
December 30, 2018: provincial DR Congo

 

These local or regional elections were organized according to the nature of the regimes in place. The most important elections were those of Guinea Conakry, on February 4, 2018, which were very conflictual and showed the drift of the regime of Alpha Condé. These elections were postponed several times between 2015 and 2018. Alpha Conde had appointed militants of his party, as district chiefs, district chiefs, mayors of communes, who were accused by the opposition of serving him for « fraud » in elections. In the municipal elections, the Alpha Condé People’s Rally of Guinea (RPG) narrowly preceded the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG), two main winners. The Union of Republican Forces (UFR) became an arbitrator. Disputes in some cities have been handled by the courts. A year later, many mayors and other local elected officials are not yet settled. Many mayors were chosen following local agreements and with some unstable elected representatives, and not according to the initial results.

In addition, senatorial took place in 4 dictatorships:
March 24, 2018: Senate Ivory Coast
March 25, 2018: Senatorial Cameroon
July 30, 2018: Senate Zimbabwe
December 29, 2018: Senate Algeria

Two constitutional referendums were held, both in very bad conditions:
May 17, 2018: constitutional referendum Burundi
July 29, 2018: constitutional referendum Comoros

Among the 10 legislative and 8 presidential, including 1 by a parliament, a majority of elections, 12 out of 18 took place in non-democratic countries, against only 6 in democracies:

Democratic

electoral processes

Electoral processes

in a non-democratic regime

Total
Presidential Legislative Total Présidential Legislative Total Pres. Leg. Tot.
2018 3+1* 2 5+1* 4 8 12 7+1* 10 17+1*
  • * : Election of the Head of State (President or 1st Minister) by Parliament

List of 10 Legislative, 7 Presidential, 1 2018 Parliamentary Election
February 15, 2018: South Africa: Election of President by Parliament
February 23, 2018: Legislative Djibouti
March 7, 2018: Legislative Sierra Leone
March 7 and 27, 2018: Sierra Leone presidential elections
March 24th to 26th (and April 24th to 26th, 2018): Presidential Egypt
July 29, 2018: Mali presidential election
July 30, 2018: Zimbabwe Legislative
July 30, 2018: Zimbabwe presidential elections
1st and 15th September 2018: Mauritanian Legislative
2nd and 3rd of September 2018: legislative Rwanda
September 21, 2018: pseudo-legislative Swaziland
October 7, 2018: presidential Cameroon
October 7, 2018: legislative Sao Tome and Principe
6th and 27th of October 2018: Gabon legislative elections
November 7 and December 19, 2018: Madagascar presidential election
December 20, 2018: legislative Togo
December 30, 2018: Congo Kinshasa presidential election (report of 2016 and 23.12.18)
December 30, 2018: Legislative Congo Kinshasa (report of 2016 and 23.12.18)
NB: Not taken into account: 2 changes of head of the executive without election:
March 27 and April 2, 2018: Ethiopia: appointment of the new Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed by the EPRDF, too far from an election.
April 1, 2018: Botswana: investiture of the new president, Mokgweetsi Masisi, former vice president, limit 2x5ans reached for Ian Khama.

Review of the 2018 election year: list of 7 presidential and 10 legislative elections (see also Appendix A)

Date State Type

Régime

Poll

P ou L

President or victorious party Duration of power
15.02.18 South Africa Démo P byParl. Cyril Ramaphosa (ANC) 0
23.02.18 Djibouti Dict.S L Boycott. Rassemblement populaire pour le Progrès (RPP, Guelleh) 39

PR 19

07.03.18

27.03.18

Sierra Leone Démo P+L Alternance de PR et de parti de PR

Cohabitation avec parti APC idem à AN

All People’s Congress (APC) 68/132

Julius Maada Bio (SLPP) 51,81%

11

PR 0

26.03.18 Egypt Dict.S P Abdel Fattah al-Sissi : 97,08% 4
29.07.18 Mali Démo P Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta 67,16% 5
30.07.18 Zimbabwe Dict.S P+L Zanu-PF : 171/270

Emmerson Mnangagwa : 50.8%

38

1

01.09.18

15.09.18

Mauritania Dict.S L Union Pour la République (UPR, Aziz) 89 / 157 5

PR 10

2-3.09.18 Rwanda Dict.S L FPR et 5 partis dans coalition : 40 / 53 24
21.09.19 eSwatini Dict.S L: pseudo Non-partisan Election PR 32
07.10.18 Cameroon Dict.S P Paul Biya 71,28% 36
07.10.18 Sao Tomé-et-Principe Démo L Alternation and cohabitation after alliance Parti de la convergence démocratique (PCD, Delfim Neves) and MLSTP-PSD 28 /55 = PCD 5 +MLSTP-PSD23 0
06.10.18

27.10.18

Gabon Dict.S L Boycott. Parti démocratique gabonais (PDG) 51

PR 9

07.11.18

19.12.18

Madagascar Démo P Alternation: Andry Rajoelina (Tanora Gasy Vonona (TGV/MAPAR) 55,66% 0
20.12.18 Togo Dict.S L Boycott. Unir (Faure Gnassingbé) 49
30.12.18 RDC Dict.S P+L False alternation PR Félix Tshisekedi

Pseudo-Cohabitation avec FCC (PPRD)

16(17JK)

PR 0

Review of the 2018 election year: presidential and legislative by type of regime

Date State Type

Régime

Poll

P ou L

President or victorious party Duration of power

Democracies : 3 presidential + 2 legislative + 1 executive head by parliament

15.02.18 South Africa Démo P by Parl. Cyril Ramaphosa (ANC) elected following resignation Jacob Zuma 0
07.03.18

27.03.18

Sierra Leone Démo P+L Alternation Assembly and PR in the same party : cohabitation

All People’s Congress (APC) 68/132

Julius Maada Bio (SLPP) 51,81%

0

PR 0

29.07.18 Mali Démo P Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta 67,16% 5
07.10.18 Sao Tomé-et-Principe Démo L Alternation Assembly and cohabitation after alliance Parti de la convergence démocratique (PCD, Delfim Neves) et MLSTP-PSD 28 / 55 = PCD 5 + MLSTP-PSD 23 0
07.11.18

19.12.18

Madagascar Démo P Alternation: Andry Rajoelina (Tanora Gasy Vonona (TGV/MAPAR) 55,66% 0

TCII : 0 présidential + 0 legislative (0 executive head by parliament)

Stable dictatorship : 4 présidential + 8 législative (0 executive head by parliament)

23.02.18 Djibouti Dict.S L Boycott. Rassemblement populaire pour le Progrès (RPP, Guelleh) 39

PR 19

26.03.18 Egypt Dict.S P Abdel Fattah al-Sissi : 97,08% 4
30.07.18 Zimbabwe Dict.S P+L Zanu-PF : 171/270

Emmerson Mnangagwa : 50.8%

38

1

01.09.18

15.09.18

Mauritania Dict.S L Union Pour la République (UPR, Aziz) 89 / 157 5

PR 10

02.09.18

03.09.18

Rwanda Dict.S L FPR and 5 partis in coalition : 40 / 53 24
21.09.19 eSwatini Dict.S L: pseudo Non-partisan election PR 32
07.10.18 Cameroon Dict.S P Paul Biya 71,28% 36
06.10.18

27.10.18

Gabon Dict.S L Boycott. Parti démocratique gabonais (PDG) 51

PR 9

20.12.18 Togo Dict.S L Boycott. Unir (Faure Gnassingbé) 49
30.12.18 RDC Dict.S P+L False alternation PR Félix Tshisekedi

Pseudo-Cohabitation avec FCC (PPRD)

16(17JK)

PR 0

 

Review of the quality of electoral processes in 2018 by type of regime

NB: « Masquerade » means « election with an electoral process diverted upstream or diverted the day of the vote or with inversion of result at the compilation and / or the publication of the results ».

Country Présidential
Type regime in 2017 Correct Doubtful Masquerade in TCII Masquerade Masquerade

≥ 10 years

Stable dictatorship Egypt

Zimbabwe

Cameroon

DRC

TCII
Démocracies South Africa (P)

Sierra Leone

Mali*

Madagascar

Totals 4 0 0 2 2

* Mali : protests with exaggerations, P: by parliament

Total: 8 including 1 per parliament

Country Legislative
Type regime in 2017 Correct Doubtful Masquerade in TCII Masquerade Masquerade

≥ 10 years

Stable dictatorship Mauritania

Zimbabwe

 

Djibouti (B)

Rwanda

eSwatini (non-P)

Gabon (B)

Togo (B)

RDC

TCII
Démocracies Sierra Leone

Sao Tomé-et-Ppe

Totals 2 0 0 2 6

B = boycott, Non-P = non-partisan

Total : 10

 

2018 in review : the quality of electoral processes

Présidentielles Législatives Total
Correct 3+1* 2 5+1*
Doubtful 0 0 0
Masquerade in TCII 0 0 0
Masquerade 2 2 4
Masquerade ≥ 10 years 2 6 8
8 10 18

* : election president by parliament

 

Country Présidential Legislative Totals
Type regime in  2016 Cor Doubt Masq.

in TCII

Mas Masq.

≥ 10years

Cor Dou Masq.

in TCII

Mas Masq.

≥ 10years

Cor. Doub Masq Total
Dictatures S. 2 2 2 6 12 12
TCII  
Démocraties 4 2 6 6
Totaux 4 2 2 2 2 6 6   12 18

 

Evolution of totals since 1990 from 2016 to 2018

Total Masquerade Doubtful Correct
1990-2015 499 260 19 220
2016 24 8 2 14
1990-2016 523 268 21 234
2017 17 6 1 10
1990-2017 540 274 22 244
2018 18 12 0 6
1990-2018 558 286 22 250

 

Three alternations took place in the 5 elections in democracy, also causing two beginnings of cohabitations, in Sierra Leone and Sao Tome and Principe. The alternation of president in Madagascar recalls that since 1990, this country paradoxically combines a fairly strong instability of government and electoral processes of fairly good quality, an exceptional case that has nothing to do with elections in dictatorship. The simulated alternation of president of the DRC is considered as a real ‘alternation’ only by international officials interested in anything other than democracy in the DRC. The president chosen by the system will have very little flexibility compared to the system to which he is now beholden.

Regarding electoral processes, 2016 was a year of strong tension in dictatorships (Uganda, Congo Brazzaville, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Chad and Gabon) and 2017 was then a year of lull. In 2018, the tension is mainly raised because of the presidential elections in Cameroon, elections in the DRC and to a lesser extent in Zimbabwe, and upstream of the boycotted legislative elections in Togo. In Djibouti and Gabon, the boycotted legislation does not correspond to anything. In these two countries, the population considers that nothing happened because the elections made no sense. In Rwanda, not much has happened in a de facto single-party situation. In Togo, the struggle was hard, involved the population and finally Faure Gnassingbé managed to obtain the boycott he hoped for, thanks to the support of ECOWAS and the difficulties of the opponents.

The year 2018 is a normal year of domination by undemocratic regimes in Africa. Their influence goes beyond what their numbers suggest, be it 20 in 2017 or 24 in 2018. They occupy the debate, seats in the UN or Ua, trying to win in the negotiations with the EU on a new Acp-Ue agreement, and put priority on the scrap of the European policy of support for democracy in Africa.

 

2.2 Forecast of the quality of electoral processes according to the nature of the regimes

 

The quality of electoral processes on one year is almost globally predictable the year before or at the beginning of the year according to the classification by type of regime, in particular because of the predictability of the elections in stable dictatorships consubstantial of the type of regime.

The rule of elections in dictatorship (recall previous studies[4]) : « There is in dictatorships no presidential or parliamentary elections correct or even doubtful without a prior transition to democracy. On the one hand, there is no election lost by the outgoing head of state or the ruling party in a stable dictatorship, with rare exceptions. On the other hand, there are no elections won by an outgoing head of state or his party in a stable dictatorship without diversion of the electoral process upstream or by massive frauds on the day of the vote. The absence of a proper electoral process defines dictatorship. If a proper election were organized, the regime would fall. In cases where the result is not inversed when the minutes of polling stations are compiled and official results are published, and where a majority of voters voted for the outgoing president or his party, the electoral process was diverted from the rules of democracy upstream by multiple available ways. »

This rule corresponds to the observation of the quality of the electoral processes according to the nature of the régimes :

Regime type Correct electoral process Doubtful electoral process Diverted electoral process without democratic value (masquerade)
Stable dictatoships Rare exceptions No one All elections

except for rare exceptions

TCII Many cases Some cases Many cases
Démocracies Large majority of cases Some cases Very few cases

 

At the 2018 calendar level, only an unscheduled election was added in January 2018 :
– February 15, 2018: South Africa: Election President by Parliament after the resignation of Jacob Zuma.
In addition, 5 elections were postponed from 2018 to 2019 :
– Legislative Guinea Bissau
– Legislative Guinea Conakry
– Legislative Madagascar
– Legislative Cameroon
– Legislative Chad
And 2 elections were postponed in 2022:
– Legislative and presidential South Sudan
Therefore, 6 legislative and 1 presidential elections were postponed. The legislative elections in Togo could have been postponed and forced into the calendar despite the majority boycott.

 

Democratic

electoral processes

Electoral processes

in a non-democratic regime

Total
Presidential Legislative Total Présidential Legislative Total Pres. Leg. Tot.
Forecast 3 6 9 5 10 15 8 16 24
Real 3+1* 2 5+1* 4 8 12 7+1* 10 17+1*

Between January 2018 and January 2019, the rankings of the regime types changed so that only the totals match.

 

Comparison between forecasts of study 14.1.18 ‘2017 in review and prospects for 2018’ and the reality :

Date Country Regime

Type

Poll

P ou L

Prediction of the type of electoral process in January 2018 (by type of regime) Power duration Reality

/forecast

23.02.18 Djibouti St.Dict L Diverted upstream (+ boycott ?) 19 years yes
07.03.18 Sierra Leone Démo P + L Corrects + application limitation 2×5 ans 10 years yes
24-26.03.18 Egypt St.Dict P Diverted upstream (+ boycott ?) 4 years yes
April 18 ? Gabon St.Dict L Diverted upstream (+ boycott ?) or exception to the rule Dict.S after conflict on inversion of result of présidential 9 years Amont

+boycott

May 18 Guinea Bissau TCII L (no forecast)  – reportée
July ? Togo St.Dict

ou TCII 18 ?

L Diverted upstream or exception to the rule Dict.S after political struggle 17-18 13 years Amont

+boycott

July-august ? Zimbabwe St.Dict

ou TCII 18?

P + L Diverted upstream upstream or exception to the rule Dict.S after fall ofMugabe Zanu-PF

38 years

Amont

 

July-august ? Mali Démo P Correct (or doubtfull ?) 5 years yes
September ? Guinea C TCII L Correct (or doubtfull ?) 8 years reportée
September ? Rwanda St.Dict L Diverted upstream 24 years yes
September ? Swaziland St.Dict L Diverted upstream (no partisan) 32 years yes
Sept-oct ? Cameroun St.Dict P + L Diverteds upstream 36 years Yes + reportée
October ? Sao Tomé&Ppe Démo L Correct 2 years yes
Oct-dec Madagascar Démo P + L Corrects or doubtfull ? 5 years Correct

reportée

November ? Mali Démo L Correct 5 years yes
Nov-dec ? Mauritania St.Dict L Diverted upstream ? 10 years yes
23.12.18 DRC TCII P + L Diverteds upstream or doubtfull? 17 years Inversion
2018 Chad St.Dict L Diverted upstream or exception to the rule Dict.S after présidential inversion 28 years reportée
2018, 2019 ? South Sudan TCII P + L Diverted upstream ? 8 years reportée

The differences between the forecasts – function of the rule of dictatorship elections – and the reality lie, on the one hand, in two cases where two hypotheses were envisaged, the legislative elections in Gabon and the elections in Zimbabwe. In Gabon, there was a strong conflict coming from the inversion of 2016 and therefore a strong rejection of power by voters, but Ali Bongo organized the electoral process by pushing the opponents of the boycott. The dictatorship remains at a very high level. In Zimbabwe, the progress of the previous year was superficial in the electoral process, and the ruling party controlled the electoral process upstream to ensure the outcome. The differences between the forecasts and the reality are, on the other hand, in the DRC where an upstream diversion was likely, but where finally Joseph Kabila chose to perform an inversion of the result in favor of a returned candidate and by imposing by force majorities in the legislative and provincial.

Among the differences in forecasts, only the DRC inversions were a surprise, because Joseph Kabila has really innovated in techniques of electoral process diversion. There was no exception to the rule of dictatorship elections, despite the reduced electorate of some dictators, particularly in Togo and Gabon, who could not escape the boycott, and despite progress in the rule of law in a country in transformation into a party dictatorship, Zimbabwe.

Unsurprisingly, in 2018, all the elections in stable dictatorship corresponded to the rule The electoral processes of the 12 elections in countries previously classified as stable dictatorship were diverted and had no democratic value : Djibouti (boycott), Mauritania, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, eSwatini (non-partisan), Gabon (boycott), Togo (boycott), DRC.

The table of 2017 corrected in February 2019, below remains valid :

Forcasts of electoral processes between 2017 and 2022 according to presence or absence of democracy v2.19

Democratic

electoral processes **

Electoral processes

in a non-democratic regime

Total
Presidential Legislative Total Presidential Legislative Total Presidential
2017 3+2* 6 9+2* 1+1* 4 5+1* 4+3* 10 14+3*
2018 3+1* 2 5+1* 4 8 12 7+1* 10 17+1*
2019 8+3* 12 20+3* 3 4 7 11+3* 16 27+3*
2020 4 5 9 6 4 10 10 9 19
2021 6+1* 5 11+1* 4 3 7 10+1* 8 18+1*
2022 2+1* 5 7+1* 2+1* 5 7+1* 4+2* 10 14+2*
Total 26+8* 35 61+8* 20+2* 28 48+2* 46+10* 63 109+10*

*: Election Head of State by Parliament **: Including in country in unstable regime, following war, and in real transition to democracy.

 

2.3 Alternations in 2018 and hard core dictatorships without alternation

 

There were two real alternations of presidents in 2018, both in democracy : in Sierra Leone (2nd since 1990) where Julius Maada Bio (SLPP) came to power in cohabitation and Madagascar Andry Rajoelina (TGV / MAPAR) (5th since 1990), and a false alternation of president in the DRC, by appointment by the president in power of a successor by inverting the result of the presidential election.

Outside the elections, in Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed has been appointed prime minister by the EPRDF coalition and is now favoring a certain democratization of this country with a unique de facto party. In two democracies in Botswana, Vice President Mokgweetsi Masisi (3rd) was inaugurated as president, pending elections in 2019. Between election and nomination in South Africa, ANC President Cyril Ramaphosa was elected president by the parliament (4th).

There were also two alternations of parties in the government, both in democracy, Sierra Leone and Sao Tome and Principe.

Electoral alternations were possible only in democracies. The number of countries in transition to democracy or instability following a war, where alternations are equally accessible, is decreasing.

The number of countries that have not experienced alternation of president in an election since 1990 has dropped from 21 to 20, counting the fake first alternation of DRC. The number of countries that have not experienced party alternations in the government since 1990 has remained stable at 26. The number of countries with a complete alternation of president and government party has remained at 30.

Once again, no single former party of the 1980s lost power and on the contrary, one of these parties returned thanks to an alliance in Sao Tome and Principe. 14 ex single parties have been in power since 1990 and 4 have returned to power, compared to 3 in 2017. (see following graph)

Comparison of the number of countries without alternation since 1990, governed by former single party, in dictatorship

From the point of view of alternations, democracy has not won a new country in 2018. The number of dictatorships (24) is close to the number of countries without alternation of party in power (26) or without complete alternation (26).

The criterion of the amount of population according to the dates of arrival of the Heads of State is the only positive parameter of the year 2018, mainly because of the DRC, even if Joseph Kabila remains there, and Ethiopia.

If this positive development is judged too favorably without taking into account the conditions of coming to power in many undemocratic cases, the effect will be to favor willingly or not the installation of dictatorships of political parties. The changes of head of state without change of party in power multiply : 3 cases in democracy, South Africa and Botswana, including one case of change of president and party of president resulting in a cohabitation, one case in dictatorship, the DRC, and one case of dictatorship evolving toward an intermediate regime retaining its ‘single party de facto’, Ethiopia.

 

Stable dictatorship TCII Démocracies Total
19 former colonies Fr

(without Morocco)

Madagascar 1
19 former colonies Uk

(without Swaziland)

Sierra Leone

Botswana

South Africa

3
14 other countries

(without Libya)

DRC (Be) Ethiopia (It)
Total 1 1 4 6

 

From this point of view, there is a paradox, the legislative elections continue to attract less attention than the presidential ones, while the weight of the majority parties in the parliaments increases in the system of government. The international contempt for the legislative, very visible in early 2019 in the DRC, hides a more complex reality, unfortunately not very favorable to democracy. The role of parliaments would need to be strengthened to strengthen democracy, provided that the legislative elections would be truly democratic, and to avoid a spread of dictatorial functioning in a growing number of actors.

Type of arrival in power of the heads of state in stable dictatorship present in 2018 year by year
22 heads of state, 23 arrivals

Heads of state or chief executive are more and more often selected profiles in the system of government. Family transmissions are rare. It is especially the consequence of the aging of the generation of heads of state of the 90s, the disappearance of the coup d’etat, the decrease of the number of wars, the change of nature of the wars, this one being more and more wars related to jihadism, and less and less wars linked to the presence of dictatorships. This evolution towards appointments often of former ministers in a continuity of the political system in place, also favors the transformations in dictatorship of political party, in the absence of political freedom and truly democratic electoral processes.

Hard core of the 10 dictatorships in Africa without alternation since 1990 (10 stable)

Accumulation of years without alternation of president (and family) and ruling party end of 2018

After the exit of 3 countries in 2017, The Gambia, Angola and Zimbabwe, the hard core of the dictatorships accumulating the most years without alternation accumulated in parliament and at the head of the executive, lost its 11th element, the DRC, in a misleading way, since Joseph Kabila retains a lot of power and keeps the possibility of maneuvering to return. Considering the times of power in the same family in Gabon, Togo, and Djibouti, the weight of the former French colonies continues to increase in this hard core : the 5 former French colonies are still in the lead at level of the accumulation of years without alternation with the presidency and the parliament.

 

2.4 Elections in dictatorship : paroxysm of the inversions of presidential results

 

The inversions of presidential results in the compilation of the minutes and the publication of the official results come back in force thanks to Joseph Kabila who innovates in electoral crime by inventing the inversion in favor of a returned opponent just before the poll. The paroxysm at the level of electoral crime but also a level inversion comes from the concomitance with the reversals of the majority of legislative and provincial. Felix Tshisekedi is a prisoner of the one who put him in power because the results of the legislative elections are totally invented by the Ceni and obliges him to accept ministers of the Kabila clan who will control him as he will control the whole society, probably continuing to prevent the construction of the rule of law.

Apart from this Congolese paroxysm, a huge soap opera for 3 years, which has cost a lot of energy to many people, other elections in dictatorship were more traditional. Maurice Kamto accused Paul Biya of having reversed the result but never provided sufficient evidence to prove it. When in doubt, there appears to have been confusion with a more usual upstream diversion of the electoral process. The Egyptian presidential election was in its way as paroxysmal to the point that it did not provoke comments, as it was obvious that it had nothing to do with a real election. The last presidential dictatorship in Zimbabwe was more ambivalent : the structure of the ruling party and the army guaranteed the possibility of a diversion of the process at certain levels while leaving the possibility for the opposition to strengthen.

 

Despite the presidential elections in 4 countries in the DRC, Cameroon, Zimbabwe and Egypt, on the side of dictatorships, the year 2018 was marked by the legislative elections, twice as many. Among the 8 legislative elections, one was a false non-partisan election, in eSwatini (Swaziland), three were boycotted, in Djibouti, Gabon and Togo, three others were diverted upstream, one radically in Rwanda, the other in a much less clear way in Mauritania, and in a more complex way in Zimbabwe. In the DRC, the Ceni used the legislative elections to show the election winners that the balance of power was actually between the army and the people. The inversion of the majority in parliament without a compilation of the minutes showed the people and diplomats that Joseph Kabila relying on the army was not willing to hear any results other than those he had invented.

 

2.5 Evolution of the quality of electoral processes from 1990 to 2018

 

With 10 legislative and 8 presidential (including one by parliament), the year 2018 contained a relatively small number of votes. 12 out of 18 took place in stable dictatorships.

Synthesis evolution of the quality of the electoral processes from 1990 to 2018, presidential and legislative together, 558 elections including 42 elections of the president or 1st minister by the parliament

It continues to be noted the decrease in the number of elections in countries in ‘Transition to democracy, in complex situations, intermediate or indeterminate regimes’ (TCII).

From 1990 to 2018, 257 presidential and legislative elections out of 558 (245 out of 540 at the end of 2017, 239 out of 523 at the end of 2016, 231 out of 499 at the end of 2015) were organized in stable dictatorships. Only 175 out of 558 polls were held in well-established democracies (169 out of 540 at the end of 2017, 164 out of 523 at the end of 2016, 152 out of 499 at the end of 2015). The last 126 have been in intermediate and complex contexts or transitions from dictatorship to democracy (TCII). Almost all the electoral process diverted or inverted (masquerade) happened in dictatorship, 246 out of 286 (234 out of 274 at the end of 2017, 228 out of 268 at the end of 2016, 220 out of 260 at the end of 2015). 164 of the correct electoral processes out of 250 came under democracy (158 out of 244 at the end of 2017, 153 out of 234 at the end of 2016, 143 out of 220 at the end of 2015).

As was predictable after the Gabon EOM-EU observe the inversion of results, EU-EOMs focused on elections without an outgoing dictator that would have made this EOM-EU useless by putting it in a position where it could be instrumentalized. In 2018, in democracy, EOM-EU facilitated the municipal elections in Tunisia, and the presidential elections in Madagascar. More difficult, in dictatorship, they accompanied the elections in Zimbabwe, without being able to act against methods of diversion upstream. The abandonment of sanctions under the Cotonou Agreement following the 2016 observation in Gabon shows a real shift in European policy, a clear decline in the political will to support the democratization of Africa, which is relatively consistent with the French position in its strong relations with the dictatorships of its former empire.

 

 

Electoral processes under stable dictatorship and regime ‘Transition to democracy, complex, intermediate and indeterminate’ (TCII) from 1990 to 2018

After a lull in 2017, undemocratic elections are on the rise and 12 occurrences are a peak in stable dictatorships that had not been reached since 2010. « Passivity, indifference, inefficiency and / or the hypocrisy of international actors, who came to light in the first half of 2016 during the first three reversals of presidential results in Congo Brazzaville, Chad and Djibouti » is confirmed. But the growing trend is in the transfer of crisis management to the African Union and regional institutions. The application of the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity, if it reduces accusations of interference, breaks the support for democracy, because of the large number of African actors refusing democracy and free choice of leaders.

 

3.     Prospects for 2019 : electoral peak (30) and record of democracy since 1990

3.1 Calendar : 2019 exceptional year for democracy in Africa

 

The year 2019 will equalize the maximum since 1990 of the number of elections of 2011 : 30. After a year of 2018 marked by the domination of elections in democratic regimes, the chance of the electoral calendar will make the year 2019 an exceptional year for democracy. 23 elections are planned outside dictatorships and only 7 in dictatorships. Democracy should reach its record, between 28 and 30 more likely. The year will also be marked by record numbers of 11 presidential and 12 legislative out of dictatorships.

2019 Summary: Presidential and Legislative
30 elections:
– 14 presidential including 3 by parliament
– 16 legislative
– 23 electoral processes in a democratic framework
– 7 electoral processes in a non-democratic framework (in bold below)

List of 16 legislative, 11 presidential and 3 elections of president by parliament :
February 16, 2019: presidential Nigeria (all 4 years old: March)
February 16, 2019: Legislative Nigeria (all 4 years old: March)
February 24, 2019 (1st round / 2): Presidential Senegal (every 7 years: February-March)
March 10, 2019: Legislative Guinea Bissau (postponed November 18, 2018)
March 24, 2019 (1st round / 2): Presidential Union of the Comoros and Governors of the Islands (advanced of 2021)
April 18, 2019: Algeria presidential election (all 5 years old: April)
April 28, 2019: legislative Benin (every 4 years: April) (Demo> Tcii in 2018)
April 28, 2019: Legislative Somaliland
2019: legislative Mali (April?, All 5 years old: November 2018)
May 8, 2019: Legislative South Africa and Election of President by Parliament
May 21, 2019: Malawi presidential election (all 5 years old: May)
May 21, 2019: Malawi Legislative (every 5 years: May)
May 27, 2019: legislative Madagascar (postponed every 5 years: Oct-Dec 2018)
May 2019 ?? : Chad legislative (after many postponements since 2015)
June 2019: Mauritanian presidential election (all 5 years: June) (limit 2×5 years reached for Aziz)
September 2019: Legislative Cameroon (report of all 5 years: September 2018)
2019: legislative Guinea (all 5 years old: September 2018) (Failure Transition (Tcii)> Dictatorship in 2018)
October 15, 2019: Mozambique presidential election (all 5 years old: October)
October 15, 2019: Legislative Mozambique (all 5 years old: October)
October 2019: Botswana legislative and election president by parliament (all 5 years: October)
November 2019? : presidential Namibia (all 5 years old: November?)
November 2019? : Namibia Legislative (all 5 years: November?)
Between 6 October and 1 December 2019: Tunisia legislative (all 5 years old: Nov-Dec?)
Between November 3 and December 29, 2019: Tunisia presidential election (all 5 years old: Nov-Dec, 2 rounds)
2019: Mauritius legislative and election 1st minister by the parliament (all 5 years, December?)
Uncertain dates:
2019: Guinea Bissau presidential election (every 5 years: April?, Postponed after the March elections) (Tcii)
2019: presidential Libya (report 2013, 2015, 2018) (Tcii)

 

Presidential Legislative Total
Electotal process : démocratic (**) 11 12 23
Electotal process : in non-démocratic regime 3 4 7
Total 14 16 30

** : Including in unstable countries, following war, real transition to democracy (in Tcii).

Calendar of Elections in Africa from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2022 – 12.1.19
NB: With RDC in DS in 2018, Guinea in DS in 2019, Ethiopia in TCII in 2020, Morocco in DS in 2021
Prediction of electoral processes between 2017 and 2022 according to presence or absence of democracy[5]

Democratic

electoral processes

Electoral processes

in a non-democratic regime

Total
Presidential Legislative Total Présidential Legislative Total Pres. Leg. Tot.
2017 3+2* 6 9+2* 1+1* 4 5+1* 4+3* 10 14+3*
2018 3+1* 2 5+1* 4 8 12 7+1* 10 17+1*
2019 8+3* 12 20+3* 3 4 7 11+3* 16 27+3*
2020 4 5 9 6 4 10 10 9 19
2021 6+1* 5 11+1* 4 3 7 10+1* 8 18+1*
2022 2+1* 5 7+1* 2+1* 5 7+1* 4+2* 10 14+2*
Total 26+8* 35 61+8* 20+2* 28 48+2* 46+10* 63 109+10*

*: Election of the Head of State (President or 1st Minister) by Parliament

**: Including in country in unstable regime, following war, in real transition to democracy.

 

Evolution of the nature of the perceptible regime in 2018 and change of election category :

TCII>Dict.S Guinea L 2019

P 2020

TCII>Dict.S DRC P+L 2018 idem (still in bold)
TCII>Dict.S Morocco L 2021
Dict.S>TCII Ethiopia L 2020

 

Forecasts in countries where the nature of the regimes has changed are more significant. In Guinea Conakry, the 2019 legislative elections and the 2020 presidential election will confirm or not the stabilization of a non-democratic regime. The process is undoubtedly still reversible and a lasting dictatorship avoidable, because of the limit of 2 mandates of the constitution and the electoral balance between party in power and opposition. In Morocco, the legislative impact little the nature of the regime dominated by the king, but the elections of 2021 will be distorted by the climate of repression of freedoms.

In Ethiopia, the legislative elections of 2020 will confirm or not a real democratization, but the EPRDF being a « single party de facto » without any competition, other signals of return towards a multiparty system would be necessary, or the elections will be able to renew again to conflicts. In the DRC, the country is stuck, and the conditions are ripe for political deterioration, without a credible election before long in the absence of major change after the inversions of early 2019.

3.2 Predicting the quality of electoral Processes in 2019 by type of regime in 2018 (and 2019)

Reminder : Based on the nature of the regimes organizing elections and the current context surrounding each electoral process, it is possible to consider the quality of the various electoral processes. The classification used below is that of the study of April 27, 2017, comprising 5 categories of electoral process in stable dictatorship extended to the elections in TCII period and in democracy with the addition of a 6th category concerning only the countries in TCII and in democracy :

  • an electoral process diverted upstream with a boycott of the real opposition,
    • electoral process mainly diverted upstream, main category in stable dictatorship,
    • electoral process with mainly massive fraud on the day of the vote,
    • electoral process with inversion of a real result at the compilation of the minutes and the publication of the results
    • doubtful electoral process (in TCII and democracy only)
    • correct electoral processes (in dictatorship: rare cases of exceptions to the dictatorship election rule).
Date Country Regime

Type

Poll

P ou L

Prediction of the type of electoral process[6] (by type of organizing regime) Reality

/forecast

16.02.19 Nigeria Democracy P+L Correct
24.02.19 Senégal Democracy P Correct (despite upstream actions)
10.03.19 Guinea Bissau TCII L Correct because of balance of forces (?)
24.03.19 Comoros TCII P Diverted uptream (?)
18.04.19 Algeria S.Dictatorship P Diverted uptream
28.04.19 Benin TCII L Diverted uptream (or correct ?) ?
28.04.19 Somaliland TCII L Correct (except 3 parties maximum)
April Mali Democracy L Correct
08.05.19 South Africa Democracy L+Pparl Correct
21.05.19 Malawi Democracy P+L Correct
27.05.19 Madagascar Democracy L Correct
May ? Chad S.Dictatorship L Diverted uptream (+JJ+ downstream)
June Mauritania S.Dictatorship P Diverted uptream (dauphin)
September Cameroon S.Dictatorship L Diverted uptream (+JJ+ downstream)
2019 Guinea C S.Dictatorship L Inversion majority downstream?  
15.10.19 Mozambique S.Dictatorship P+L Diverted uptream  
October Botswana Democracy L+Pparl Correct
November ? Namibia Democracy P+L Correct
Oct-Dec Tunisia Democracy P+L Correct
December ? Mauritus Democracy L+Pparl Correct
Dates incertaines :
2e semester Guinea Bissau TCII P Correct because of balance of forces (?)
2e semester Libya TCII P Doubtfull

(Diverted uptream/correct ?)

?

 

The quality of the electoral process is difficult to predict in 2 cases of intermediate regimes, complex or unstable, the legislative in Benin, a case between president ready for anything and ‘strong opposition and institutions still solid’, and the presidential in Libya, for which too many parameters are still moving. In the Still in middle regime, in a process of dictatorization, in the Comoros, the latest signals in the elimination of candidates and parties, shows that a diversion of the electoral process is being prepared.

Six out of seven non-democratic polls are likely to succeed each other around the summer, which will help to limit the mobilization of protest. No boycott is predictable yet.

Reminder : The electoral processes diverted upstream with or without a boycott of the real opposition, with mainly massive fraud on the day of the vote, and with a reversal of a real result at the compilation of the minutes and the publication of the results, are, in the following classification, grouped under the label « masquerade ». « Masquerade » means in this study « election to the electoral process diverted upstream or diverted the day of the vote, or with inversion of result at the compilation and / or the publication of the results » and « ≥ 10 years « means » after more than 10 years of power ».

 

Country Presidential elections
Regime

type

Correct Doubtfull Masquerade in TCII Masquerade Masquerade

≥ 10 years

Stable

Dictatorship

Algeria

Mauritania

Mozambique

TCII Guinea Bissau Libya Comoros
Démocracies Nigeria

Senegal (despite upstream)

South Africa (P.Parl)

Malawi

Botswana (P.Parl)

Namibia

Tunisia

Mauritius (P.Parl)

Totals 9 1 1 3

Total : 14 of which 3 per parliament and 4 electoral processes diverted upstream (Comoros probable).

 

Country Legislative elections
Regime

type

Correct Doubtfull Masquerade in TCII Masquerade Masquerade

≥ 10 years

Stable

Dictatorship

Guinea C Cameroon

Chad

Mozambique

TCII Guinea Bissau

Somaliland

  Benin (?)
Démocracies Nigeria

Mali

South Africa

Malawi

Madagascar

Botswana

Namibia

Tunisia

Mauritius

Totals 11 1 1 3

Total : 16 legislative, including 3 and probably 4 electoral processes diverted upstream and an electoral process may be diverted downstream, the compilation of the minutes and the announcement of the results, an assumption without certainty for legislative in Guinea Conakry.

Forecast of the review of the quality of electoral processes in 2018

Présidential Législative Total
Correct 9 11 20
Doubtfull 1 0 1
Masquerades in TCII 1 1 2
Masquerades 0 1 1
Masquerades ≥ 10 ans 3 3 6
14 16 30

 

With 20 correct elections out of 30, the year 2019 could exceed by 4 elections its last maximum of the number of correct elections of 2011.

 

Country Presidential Legislative Totals
Regime

Type

Cor Doub Masq.

in TCII

Masq Masq.

≥ 10years

Cor Doub Masq.

in TCII

Masq Masq.

≥ 10years

Cor. Doub Masq Total
Dictatorship 3 1 3 7 7
TCII 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 2 6
Démocracies 8 9 17 17
Total 9 1 1 3 11 1 1 3 20 1 9 30

Evolution of totals since 1990 from 2016 to 2019 (forecast for 2019)

Total Masquerade Doubtfull Correct
1990-2015 499 260 19 220
2016 24 8 2 14
1990-2016 523 268 21 234
2017 17 6 1 10
1990-2017 540 274 22 244
2018 18 12 0 6
1990-2018 558 286 22 250
2019 30 9 1 20
1990-2019 588 295 23 270

 

3.3 Elections in Africa in 2019 : concentration of difficulties in the former French colonies

 

After the electoral paroxysm of multiple inversions in January 2019 in DRC, the historic summit of electoral crime in Africa, the large number of democratic elections will return in early and late 2019 a positive image of elections in Africa.

The undemocratic elections will take place mainly in the former French colonies : a priori in 7 out of 8 countries, in Algeria, Mauritania, Comoros, for the presidential elections, Cameroon, Chad, Guinea Conakry and Benin, for the legislative elections. The only other country will be Mozambique for legislative and presidential elections. The crisis in Benin linked to the repression of the opposition, in particular of the Liberal Social Union (USL) could become visible internationally. In Guinea Conakry, if the legislative elections go wrong, the failure of the transition to democracy since 2010 will become more and more visible, especially as a presidential approach with a limit of 2 mandates reached. The concentration of electoral crimes and conflicts in the former French colonies in 2019 could reinforce the understanding of the growing gap between Francophone and Anglophone Africa in the nature of political regimes.

Locals will go unnoticed although they allow to root democracy and are not negligible.

The possibility outside dictatorships to improve electoral processes, through upstream technical support and observation missions, may still be visible in Madagascar, Mali or even Tunisia. Above all, in Guinea-Bissau, the elections could bring the country out of the instability of government despite constitutional obsolescence. The establishment of elections in Libya is part of a larger building-rescue project of the state.

The last country of the four inversions of the results of presidential elections in 2016 should finally reach the legislative elections in 2019, Chad. In this country, the opposition is much less destroyed by the inversion and the aftermath of the inversion, than in Djibouti, Congo Brazzaville and Djibouti, but the president in power since 1989 is not ready to let it speak.

The issue of term limits will continue to cause conflict. In 2019, the main one will be Sudan. Omar El-Beshir is not sure he can change the constitution to be able to represent himself. In Algeria, the health of Abdelaziz Bouteflika demonstrates absurdity of setting the mandate counter when the limit of the mandate was added in 2016. In Egypt, the worst dictator of Africa of the moment will have no difficulty in breaking the lock. In Togo, if a limit will eventually be set in 2019, in 2018 Ecowas helped Faure Gnassingbé to obtain a single-color assembly in a boycotted election, helping him to be able to do so by resetting the counter and retrying to divert the electoral process of the presidential election of 2020. In Guinea Conakry, doubts persist on the will of the president to remove the limit. Beginning of 2019, Alassane Ouattara showed that he felt in a strong position to impose a resetting of his counter before the presidential 2020. A dictator will leave in 2019 because of the limit, Ould Abdel Aziz, Mauritania. In this country, the question can become that of a transformation or not into a dictatorship of a political party. The electoral race remains open, although an upstream diversion is likely in June 2019.

 

 

Conclusion

 

In 2018, the hope of a quick shift towards a majority of democracies from dictatorships has disappeared. The year ends on the worst. Ending the desperation of the supporters of a faster democratization, the DRC’s electoral election process resulted in the worst electoral crime in the history of elections in Africa.

Yet, the year that begins now should be, by the greatest chance of the electoral calendar, a record year for democracy in Africa. Africa will never have had as many democratic elections as those announced in 2019. Now, from the political point of view, there are two Africas separated by a clear barrier, although many hypocrites say, flatterers and phrasers : on the one hand, the democratized regimes, on a precise date without any possible contestation, and on the other, the dictatorial regimes whose stories of electoral crimes are constantly being lengthened.

Strangely, this positive conjunction comes at a time when the facts concerning modes of government and elections show that democracy is declining sharply in Africa as it seems to be shrinking in the rest of the world. The facts are stubborn, the statistics of electoral processes in Africa will only improve when new states pass the stage of the undeniable installation of democracy without power installed maintening itself by force. The election year 2019 will also be exceptional because it will show in two thirds of the cases an image rather contrary to the evolution on a complete electoral cycle of 5 years in 55 countries.

In 2018, hopes for progress in 2017 have completely disappeared in the DRC or Togo but also in Zimbabwe. In these countries, political parties and people will have to continue fighting. In Sudan, too, in a country considered to be very repressive, the desperate population eventually rose to prevent the president from changing the constitution. The future of Sudan is now uncertain.

In 2019, the Union of the Comoros could continue to sink into the dictatorship at the time of the presidential election. Spurts are still possible in 2019 in Benin or Guinea Conakry at the time of the legislative elections, and if this is not the case, the dictatorization will continue. Ethiopia will wait until 2020 to confront its new governance with elections. Central African Republic, South Sudan and Libya will remain destabilized for a long time by conflicts and these countries do not impact the process of continental democratization.

The dictatorships that were threatened to lose their majority in number, have recovered. They did more than resist. Taking advantage of the disruption of the African Union (AU), the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity between AU, UN and EU, or the weakness of the European position in the negotiations of a new ACP-EU agreement, African dictators, in 2018, they strongly reinforced their international influence in Brussels or New York, making possible what should never have been possible, for example, the shameless validation of a multiple reversal of results in Kinshasa. The innovation in electoral crime in this paroxysm is based on incompetence never reached in the analysis of the process. The denial of the inversion, at the summit of certain towers of New York, recalls the racist colonial unconscious of the worst hours of history.

The balance of power between heads of state maintaining themselves in power by false elections – ‘fake-elections’ would be more up-to-date – and people harden, but law enforcement techniques are improving. Outside of Sudan, the balance of power becomes hidden, a potential of violence is created when the confrontation is avoided. And Africa continues to evolve, outside of politics where it does not make sense, ans with politics where the choice of leaders is possible.

In background, the relationship between the European Union and the African Union continues to change. No one can say anymore whether the EU still believes in its role of supporting democracy or whether it is sailing by sight in a complexity that exceeds it, because of a lack of consensus in Europe on relations with undemocratic powers. The French position on elections in Africa does not seem to move, to the point of recalling the invention of fraud methods by the French colonial administration in the years 1945-1955. In the context of the decline of democracy in Africa in 2018, the renegotiation of the Cotonou agreements on which the use of European aid depends in the longer term seems wrong part. Can the multiplication of meetings and the communication ‘all smiles’ help to stem the negative influence of undemocratic leaders and orient these leaders towards more humanity ?

Dictatorships resulting from the period of single parties gradually escape any influence, wethers firm or soft, to the point that nothing prevents more candidates already victims of electoral crimes to be jailed like Jean-Marie Michel Mokoko or Maurice Kamto. The ‘victories’ of dictators send always further towards a stalemate. The continental democratic shift is moving away in time, but the obsolescence of reactionary positions in the face of progress desired by the peoples is only more visible. Things change without it being visible, surprises are preparing in the shadows. Between the supposed rationality of diplomacy and the decay of increasingly rapid situations, the gap is too great.

Régis Marzin,

Paris, February 13, 2019

 

NOTES

A.    History 2018: election year

 

2018 Summary : Presidential and Legislative
18 elections :
– 8 presidential ones including one by parliament
– 10 legislative
– 6 electoral processes in a democratic framework
– 12 electoral processes in a non-democratic framework (in bold below)

 

List of 10 Legislative, 7 Presidential, 1 2018 Parliamentary Election by Parliament
February 15, 2018: South Africa: Election of President by Parliament
February 23, 2018: Legislative Djibouti
March 7, 2018: Legislative Sierra Leone
March 7 and 27, 2018: Sierra Leone presidential elections
March 24th to 26th (and April 24th to 26th, 2018): Presidential Egypt
July 29, 2018: Mali presidential election
July 30, 2018: Zimbabwe Legislative
July 30, 2018: Zimbabwe presidential elections
1st and 15th September 2018: Mauritanian Legislative
2nd and 3rd of September 2018: legislative Rwanda
September 21, 2018: pseudo-legislative Swaziland
October 7, 2018: presidential Cameroon
October 7, 2018: legislative Sao Tome and Principe
6th and 27th of October 2018: Gabon legislative elections
November 7 and December 19, 2018: Madagascar presidential election
December 20, 2018: legislative Togo
December 30, 2018: Congo Kinshasa presidential election (report of 2016 and 23.12.18)
December 30, 2018: Legislative Congo Kinshasa (report of 2016 and 23.12.18)

 

Source Electoral History 2018 at 14.1.18 updated on :

https://regardexcentrique.wordpress.com/2012/08/04/calendrier-des-elections-en-afrique/#18

Links to sources only in french version :

https://regardexcentrique.wordpress.com/2019/02/13/democraties-et-dictatures-en-afrique-bilan-2018-et-perspectives-2019/#_Toc978783

 

February 4, 2018: local / communal Guinea Conakry (postponed 2015, src, before 30.6.16, src, src12.16, 18.12.16 according to agreement12.10.16, src, march-april 2017, src4.2.17, designation heads of pro-rata neighborhood and district communal, according to opposition Alpha Conde « nominates zealous militants of his party, as district leaders, district leaders, mayors of communes » who serve for « fraud » election, CellouDaleinDiallo26-5-17, results: Rally of the people of Guinea (RPG) ahead of the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG), two main winners, Union of Republican Forces (UFR) as an arbitrator, challenges in some cities treated by courts, src1, src2)

February 15, 2018: South Africa: Election by the parliament of Cyril Ramaphosa to the presidency after the resignation of Jacob Zuma on 14.2.18 after the threats of the ANC to dismiss him because of several cases (scr1, src2)

February 23, 2018: Legislative Djibouti (masquerade 4 *, result without interest, electoral procesuss diverted upstream by disorganization 100% of the real opposition and 100% creation of a false opposition system neutralized, built around 4 statutes legal, src1, src2, sourceIPU date, source23.2)

7 March 2018: Legislative Sierra Leone (report 4 months / all 5 years: November, src, src2, beginning cohabitation, All People’s Congress (APC) 68/132, Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) 48/132, Coalition for Change 8 , NGC 4, Independents 3, Elected Chiefs (traditional) 12, 1 unknown, known result at the same time as presidential 1 month after, CEN6-4.18, opinionMEE-UE4.4.18)

March 7, 2018: local Sierra Leone (Local Council Elections, postponed from November 2016 to not before the presidential election of 2018, same day presidential and legislative of March 7, source, source2)

24 to 26 March (and 24 to 26 April) 2018: Egyptian presidential election (every 4 years: May, src, src2), masquerade 4 *, kind of imposed boycott, single candidate or almost, 1st round: Abdel Fattah al-Sissi : 97.08%, participation 41.5%, according to National Elections Authority, src)

7 and 27 March 2018: presidential Sierra Leone (report 4 months / all 5 years: November, srce, src2, limitation of mandate 2×5 years reached for Ernest Bai Koroma (APC), alternation of president and party of president and early cohabitation, 1st round Julius Maada Bio (Sierra Leone People’s Party, SLPP) 43.3% = 1,097,482, Samura Kamara (All People’s Congress, APC) 42.7% = 1,082,748, Yumkella Kandeh (NGC) 174,014 = 6.9%) Samuel Sam-Sumana (APC) 87.720 = 3.4%, 2nd round: Julius Maada Bio (SLPP) 51.81% Samura Kamara (APC) 48.19%, result-5.4.18, source, opinionMOE -UE4.4.18)

March 24, 2018: Senate of Côte d’Ivoire (date: src, March 24, Rally of the Houphouetists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP) 50/66 seats, src)

March 25, 2018: Senatorial Cameroon (Masquerade)

March 27, 2018 and April 2: Ethiopia appointment of the new Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed by the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Front (EPRDF), Abiy Ahmed from the Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization (OPDO) one of the 4 community and regional parties of the EPRDF coalition.

April 1, 2018: Botswana: investiture of the new president, Mokgweetsi Masisi, former vice president, limit 2x5ans reached for Ian Khama.

12 April (and 12 May) 2018: local Gambia (sourceIEC, United Democratic Party (UDP, Adama Barrow), 62 seats / 120, Democratic Congress of The Gambia (GDC) 23, APRC (ex Yahya Jammeh) 18, src, src2)

May 17, 2018: Burundi: constitutional referendum (change to 7-year terms with reset of the meter so that Pierre Nkuruziza can make 5 mandates and remains until 2034 (29 years of power), srce, sourceMai, src17.5, terror, intimidation, repression, masquerade, yes 73.2% src)

May 6, 2018: local / municipal Tunisia (regions are added to the departments and municipalities, report of October 30, 2016 src, src2, infosfenir, src26.3.17, report of 26.3.17 src25.7.16, src10.1.17, srcNov, srce26 .11.17, src17.12.17, file, of 17.12.17, src, of 25.3.18, report, src060518, results: Ennahda tops in 155 municipalities / 350, 2135 seats / 7212 = 28.6%, Nidaa Tounes 96+ 1595 = 22.17% independent 83 + 2375 = 32.9%, abstention 64.4%, women 44% of the elected representatives, src, src2)

July 29, 2018: Constitutional referendum Comoros (passage of 1 mandate to 2 mandates of 5 years maximum, Azali Assoumani can be maintained until 2029, 3 positions of vice presidents removed + Constitutional Court is dissolved + presidential advance in 2019, src1, src2, src3, masquerade in dictatorization: accusation of ballot stuffing, src, yes: 92.34%, participation rate 62.71% disputed by observers of EASF (Eastern Africa Standby Force), src)

July 30, 2018: Legislative Zimbabwe (date: src1, victory Zanu-PF (Emmerson Mnangagwa) 145/210 against 63 for MDC, MFN: 1, independent 1, src1, src, + women: 26 Zanu-PF + 21 MDC Total 171 / 270 Zanu-PF, 84 MDC, src, analysis R * E)

July 30, 2018 (and September 8): Zimbabwe presidential election (date: src1, date 2nd round found during the first round, src, embezzlement of upstream electoral process: R * E analysis, Emmerson Mnangagwa (ZANU-PF) in the first round 50.8% = 2,460,463 votes, Nelson Chamisa (MDC-T): 44.3% = 2,147,436, scr)

July 30, 2018: Zimbabwe Senate (Zanu-PF victory)

July 30, 2018: local Zimbabwe (59 districts, all 5 years: July, no trace of result in 8.8.18, src)

July 29 and August 12, 2018: Mali presidential election (every 5 years: July-August, srcdate, src2ndtourconnuelors1ertour, fraud that does not change a priori not the final result, doubtless exaggerated dispute, ISS, Cocem, 220 000 ballot, 1st round : IBK (RPM) 41.70%, Soumaïla Cissé (URD) ​​17.78%, Aliou Diallo (ADP) 8.03%, Modibo Diarra (RPDM) 7.39%, participation 42.70% src; 2nd round: Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta 67.16% vs. Soumaïla Cissé 32.84%, participation 34.54%, src, EU-EOM: preliminary statement14.8)

2 to 3 + 4 September 2018: legislative Rwanda (every 5 years: September, src, 53 of the 80 deputies the 2 and 3 + indirect suffrage 24 + 3 women (+ youth, disabled) 4, embezzlement upstream, MOE -UA, RPF and 5 parties in coalition: 40/53 (-1) 74% vote, 3 other allies Kagame: Social Democrat Party (PSD) 5 (-2), Liberal Party (PL) = another RPF ally 4, PS Imberakuri 2, the only opposition party: Democratic Green Party of Rwanda (Frank Habineza): 2 (+2), women: 67.5% instead of 63%, src)

1st and 15th September 2018: legislative Mauritania (all 5 years: nov-dec, src1, src2, diversion upstream probable even if a part of the population follows Aziz, Union For the Republic (UPR = Majority Aziz) 89/157, participation 46% , src, src2, so-called « radical » opposition: 29 seats, including 14 Islamist Tawassoul party, 10 other so-called « moderate » opposition, src3, missesultatici29.9)

1st and 15th September 2018: local / municipal Mauritania (all 5 years old: nov-dec, src1, src2), Union Pour la Republique (UPR = Majority Aziz) 6 communes in Nouakchott out of 9, Nord-Nouadhibou, Zouerate, Rosso, Boghé , Union for Democracy and Progress (UDP): Kaedi (2nd majority party), src, UPR (942 advisor), UDP (292), Tewassoul (106), El Karama (98), UFP Coalition, Hatem, Tewassoul and Adil (79), AND (62), El Wiam (52) … src2)

1st and 15th of September 2018: regional Mauritania (src1, src2, Union For the Republic (UPR = Majority Aziz) 12 councils / 13, src, UPR (111 advisers), Tewassoul (26), Hatem Coalition, Tewassoul and UDP (21) , UDP (19), AJD-MR Coalition and Tewassoul (5), src2)

21 September 2018: pseudo-legislative eSwatini = Swaziland (every 5 years: September, src, masquerade !, political parties more or less banned (authorized in 2005 without being able to participate in elections, src), Mswati III in power since 25 April 1986, Tinkudla = constituency center, boycott PUDEMO, src, src2)
September 22, redesigned September 29, 2018: Nigeria: election governor State of Osun, (contested / pressure on voters: Gboyega Oyetola, Congress of Progressives (APC, Buhari) 255,505, Ademola Adeleke, Democratic People’s Party (PDP) 255,023, 482 less, src1, src2, Ademola Adeleke won 22.9)

October 7, 2018: Cameroon presidential election (all 7 years old: October, Paul Biya 86 years old!, Src, embezzlement upstream electoral process (using among others the Anglophone crisis) + JJ fraud and compilation results Kamto denounces’ 1 327 000 votes fraudulently attributed to Paul Biya ‘(out of 2 521 934) = inversion charge, src1, src2, src3, USA, bishops, EU-EEAS, Fr-MEAE + MEP, RSF, Paul Biya 71.28%, Mauritius Kamto (Movement for the rebirth of Cameroon, RCM) 14.23%), Cabral Libii (Universe) 6.28%, Joshua Osih (Social Democratic Front, SDF) 3.35%, Adamou Ndam Njoya (Democratic Union of Cameroon ( UDC) 1.73%), Garga Haman Adji Alliance for Democracy and Development, 1.55%, Franklin Afanwi Ndifor (MCNC), 0.67%), Serge Espoir Matomba (PURS) 0.56% and Akere Muna , who withdrew his candidacy (FPD) 0.35%, registered 6 667 754, voters 3 590 681, participation 53.85%, src1, src2)

7 October 2018: Legislative Sao Tome and Principe (Independent Democratic Action (ADI) 32,805, 41.81%, 25/55, -2., Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe – Social Democratic Party (MLSTP-PSD) 31,634, 40.32%, 23, -2, PCD-MDFM-UDD Alliance, Democratic Convergence Party (PCD), Movement for the Forces for Democratic Change (MDFM), Union of Democrats for Citizenship and Development (UDD), 7,451, 9.50%, 5, -2, Independent Citizen Movement of Sao Tome and Principe (MCISTP), 1659, 2.11%, 2, src1, src2, EU opinion, 22.11 .18: alternation and cohabitation after opposition alliance: Delfim Neves of the Party of Democratic Convergence (PCD), takes the lead National Assembly with 28 seats / 55 = PCD 5 + MLSTP-PSD 23 => Government will come from the new Assembly, src )

October 7, 2018: local / municipal and regional Sao Tome and Principe (with legislative, all 4 years: october, avisUE, src)

October 10, 2018: local / municipal Mozambique (all 5 years: November, source, protest Renamo / Frelimo on 4 cities, src, EU13.10)

13 October 2018: local / municipal and regional Ivory Coast (report of April 2018, source, return to April 2018, src1, src2, boycott, victory RHDP coalition (RDR Ouattara) which loses PDCI (Bédié) in its coalition, src)

October 6th and 27th, 2018: Gabon legislative elections (report every 5 years: December 2016, then July 2017, src, then April 2017, src, analysis, diversion upstream + boycott related to reversal result 2016)

October 6 and 27, 2018: local Gabon (every 5 years: december, src, embezzlement upstream + boycott related to reversal result 2016)

7 November and 19 December 2018: Madagascar presidential election (all 5 years: Sept-Oct-Dec, srce, 24.11 + 24.12.18 ?, src2, 1st round: Andry Rajoelina 39.23%, Marc Ravalomanana 35.35%, Hery Rajaonarimampianina 8.82%, Andre Mailhol (1.27%), participation rate reached 53.9%, src, 2nd round: Andry Rajoelina (Tanora Gasy Vonona (TGV / MAPAR) 55.66%, Marc Ravalomanana (TIM) 44.34% participating 48.09%, src)

20 December 2018: legislative Togo (diversion upstream with complicity Cedeao + boycott, all 5 years: July?, Date given by ECOWAS 31.7.18 to 17’10, src2, result without value: Unir 59/91, UFC 6, MPDD 3 , NET 3, … src)

December 29, 2018: Senate Algeria (1/2 renewed Senate, FLN 29/48, National Democratic Rally (RND) 10, Independents 4, Front of the Socialist Forces (FFS) 2, Front al-Moustakbel 2, src, src2)

December 30, 2018: Congo Kinshasa presidency (postponed November 27, 2016, and December 2017, src, src13.2.15, calendar, April 29, 2018 according to agreement 18.10.16 of the pseudo national dialogue with Vital Kamerhe, 12.17 according to agreement 31.12.17, src2, src23-12-18, report23> 30.12.18, limitation 2×5 years reached for Joseph Kabila (PPRD), reversal of the result at the compilation of the minutes and the official announcement by the Ceni, with the complicity of de the Constitutional Court, the biggest scandal of the African electoral history, first inversion in favor of a false-opponent returned at the last moment, estimate to 1% real result by Cenco: Martin Fayulu (Lamuka) 62,11%, Felix Tshisekedi 16.93%, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary (FCC, Kabila) 16.88%, other candidates 4.09%, fictitious official result: Felix Tishekedi absorbed by the dictatorial system of Kabila, fictitious alternation, src1, src2)

December 30, 2018: Legislative Congo Kinshasa (report 27.11.16, then 12.17: src13.2.15, calendar, 29.4.18 according to agreement 18.10.16 of the pseudo national dialogue with Vital Kamerhe, 12.17 according to agreement31.12.17, src2, src23-12- 18, report23> 30.12.18, no verifiable result as no compilation, srcTv5world, RFI, official result invented with reversed majority, biggest scandal of African electoral history)

December 30, 2018: provincial elections RDCongo (MPPs) (report February 25, 2013, and 2013, source1, report 2014 source2, source3, source13.2.15, source, report of October 25, 2015, 12.17 according to agreement of 31.12.17, source2, possibility of postponement of 3 months?, source, report of December 2017, source23-12-18, report23> 30.12.18, no verifiable result because no compilation, srcTv5world, official result invented with majority reversed)

 

B.    Forecasts 2019 : election year (at 12.2.19)

 

2019 Summary : Presidential and Legislative
30 elections :
– 14 presidential including 3 by parliament
– 16 legislative
– 23 electoral processes in a democratic framework
– 7 electoral processes in a non-democratic framework (in bold below)

List of 16 Legislative, 11 Presidential, 3 Election of President by Parliament
February 16, 2019: presidential Nigeria (all 4 years old: March)
February 16, 2019: Legislative Nigeria (all 4 years old: March)
February 24, 2019 (1st round / 2): Presidential Senegal (every 7 years: February-March)
March 10, 2019: Legislative Guinea Bissau (postponed November 18, 2018) (Tcii)
March 24, 2019 (1st round / 2): Presidential Union Comoros and Governors Islands (advanced 2021) (Demo> Tcii 2018)
April 18, 2019: Algeria presidential election (all 5 years old: April)
April 28, 2019: legislative Benin (every 4 years: April) (Demo> Tcii in 2018)
April 28, 2019: Legislative Somaliland
2019: legislative Mali (April?, All 5 years old: November 2018)
May 8, 2019: Legislative South Africa and Election of President by Parliament
May 21, 2019: Malawi presidential election (all 5 years old: May)
May 21, 2019: Malawi Legislative (every 5 years: May)
May 27, 2019: legislative Madagascar (postponed every 5 years: Oct-Dec 2018)
May 2019 ?? : Chad legislative (after many postponements since 2015)
June 2019: Mauritanian presidential election (all 5 years: June) (limit 2×5 years reached for Aziz)
September 2019: Legislative Cameroon (report of all 5 years: September 2018)
2019: legislative Guinea (all 5 years old: September 2018) (Failure Transition (Tcii)> Dictatorship in 2018)
October 15, 2019: Mozambique presidential election (all 5 years old: October)
October 15, 2019: Legislative Mozambique (all 5 years old: October)

October 2019: Botswana legislative and election president by parliament (all 5 years: October)
November 2019? : presidential Namibia (all 5 years old: November?)
November 2019? : Namibia Legislative (all 5 years: November?)
Between 6 October and 1 December 2019: Tunisia legislative (all 5 years old: Nov-Dec?)
Between November 3 and December 29, 2019: Tunisia presidential election (all 5 years old: Nov-Dec, 2 rounds)
2019: Mauritius legislative and election 1st minister by the parliament (all 5 years, December?)
Uncertain:
2019: Guinea Bissau presidential election (every 5 years: April?, Postponed after the March elections) (Tcii)
2019: presidential Libya (report 2013, 2015, 2018) (Tcii)

 

Calendar of Elections in Africa from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2022 – 12.1.19
NB: With RDC in DS in 2018, Guinea in DS in 2019, Ethiopia in TCII in 2020, Morocco in DS in 2021
Prediction of electoral processes between 2017 and 2022 according to presence or absence of democracy[7]

Democratic

electoral processes **

Electoral processes

in a non-democratic regime

Total
Presidential Legislative Total Présidential Legislative Total Pres. Leg. Tot.
2017 3+2* 6 9+2* 1+1* 4 5+1* 4+3* 10 14+3*
2018 3+1* 2 5+1* 4 8 12 7+1* 10 17+1*
2019 8+3* 12 20+3* 3 4 7 11+3* 16 27+3*
2020 4 5 9 6 4 10 10 9 19
2021 6+1* 5 11+1* 4 3 7 10+1* 8 18+1*
2022 2+1* 5 7+1* 2+1* 5 7+1* 4+2* 10 14+2*
Total 26+8* 35 61+8* 20+2* 28 48+2* 46+10* 63 109+10*

*: Election Head of State by Parliament **: Including in country in unstable regime, following war, and in real transition to democracy.

 

Evolution of the nature of the perceptible regime in 2018 and change of election category:

TCII>Dict.S Guinea C L 2019

P 2020

TCII>Dict.S DRC P+L 2018 idem (restées en gras)
TCII>Dict.S Morocco L 2021
Dict.S>TCII Ethiopia L 2020

 

Electoral calendar 2019 to 12.2.19

which will be updated regularly on:

https://regardexcentrique.wordpress.com/2012/08/04/calendrier-des-elections-en-afrique/#18

Links to sources only in french version :

https://regardexcentrique.wordpress.com/2019/02/13/democraties-et-dictatures-en-afrique-bilan-2018-et-perspectives-2019/#_Toc978784

 

February 16, 2019: Nigeria presidential (every 4 years: March, source16.2.19, biometric authentication on the day of the vote, src, 7th use in Africa, src)

February 16, 2019: Legislative Nigeria (every 4 years: March, source16.2.19, biometric authentication on the day of the vote, src, 7th use in Africa, src)

February 24, 2019 (1st round / 2): Presidential Senegal (every 7 years: February-March ?, date) (pledge Macky Sall to reduce the mandate to 5 years on mandate in progress abandoned on 16.2.16, source2)

March 2, 2019: Elections Assembly of (Regional) States and State Governors Nigeria (with presidential and legislative, every 4 years: April, source2.3.19, state local assembly = assembly of states and not local, possible misunderstandings, source)

March 10, 2019: Legislative Guinea Bissau (all 4 years: April, postponed from 5.18, srcmai, reportdemai, src18.11, postponed from 18.11.18, src, srcWP, src10.3.19)

March 24, 2019: constitutional referendum Burkina Faso (src)

March 24 and? 2019 (2 rounds): presidential Union of the Comoros and Governors of the Islands: advanced of 2021 in 2018, src1, src2, src24.3)

April 18, 2019: Algerian presidential election (every 5 years: April, term of office set to 1 for Bouteflika in 2016 with the addition of a limit of 2, src)

April 28, 2019: legislative Benin (every 4 years: April, src)

April 28, 2019: Legislative Somaliland (with biometrics by iris recognition, postponement of 2010, then 2013 to be at the same time presidential, then of June 26, 2015, then of December 2016 source, source2, source3, biometrics: sourceb1, sourceb2, source27.3.17, source2, report of 27.3.17 in January 17 due to drought, source, report2019)

April 28, 2019: municipal / local Somaliland (source)

April 2019: legislative Mali (all 5 years: November 2018, src, carried over from 28.10.18 + 18.11.18 src, then from 25.11 + 16.12.18 src)

2019? : regional Mali (regional reports of 26.4.14 and October 2014, then 26 or 28 April 2015 due to insecurity and impossibility to revise list in the North, then 25 October 2015, then 25.9.16, then 26.11. 17 source 1, source 2, source3, source25oct15, sourcereportoct15, source report9.16, source20.11, source26.11.17, source26.12.17, report 26.12.17, source, report from April 2018)

2019? : Local / Councilors of Partial Circles and Communes Mali (report29.10.17, source, source, report 26.12.17, source, report of April 2018)

May 8, 2019: Legislative South Africa with election of the president by the parliament (all 5 years: May, src)

May 27, 2019: legislative Madagascar (all 5 years old: sept-dc 2018, src1, src2), report March 2019, src)

2019? : provincial and regional Madagascar (territorial by universal suffrage and not indirect suffrage, source1, source2, postponement of 2017 ?, source)

May 21, 2019: Malawi presidential election (all 5 years old: May, src)

May 21, 2019: Malawi Legislative (every 5 years: May?)

May 21, 2019: Malawi local (every 5 years, with legislative and presidential: May?)
2019 May ?? : Chad legislative (all 4 years: postponed from February 2015 to 2016, postponed in January 2016 to after the presidential elections, postponed without any debate by Déby from 2017 to 2019 on 3.2.17, src, src2, src3, src1-2019, src2 -2019, 2018-180101, src-nov18, report 11.18, Macron23.12.18)

2019 May ?? : local Chad, (postponed from 2015 with first biometrics? postponed in January 2016 to after the presidential, source, reported at the same time as legislative 3.2.17 lack of money ?, source, Macron23.12.18)

June 2019: Mauritanian presidential election (all 5 years: June, src) (departure from Aziz after 2×5 years according to article 28 of 2006 of the constitution of 1991 revised in 2006)

2019? : legislative Guinea C (every 5 years: September 2018, src1, src2)

2019? : local Ghana (elections of assemblies of ditsricts and unit committees, every 4 years: September?)

September 2019: legislative Cameroon (all 5 years: September 2018 ?, postponed to 2019, src1, src2)

September 2019? : municipal Cameroon (all 5 years: September ?, postponed from 2018, src)

October 2019: Legislative Botswana + confirmation or not prior election president by parliament by majority (every 5 years: October) (Ian Khama terms ends 31 March 2018, 18 months before, if 2 end of terms are separated since 1998 because of the resignation of Quett Masire in 1998, source, Ifri11.18)

October 2019: local Botswana (all 5 years old: October)

2019? : local / district-municipal-districts Ethiopia (every 5 years, April?, report 2018 to 2019, src)

2019: Ethiopia: Election President (Symbolic Function) Election President by Council of Peoples Representatives (every 6 years: October?)

October 15, 2019: Mozambique presidential election (every 5 years: October, src)

October 15, 2019: legislative Mozambique (every 5 years: October, src)

October 15, 2019: Provincial Mozambique (every 5 years: October, src)

November 2019? : Presidential Namibia (all 5 years old: November ?, with electronic voting machines, src)

November 2019? : Namibia Legislative (all 5 years: November ?, with electronic voting machines, src)

Between 6 October and 1 December 2019: Tunisia legislative (all 5 years: Nov-Dec, src, src2)

Between November 3 and December 29, 2019 (2 rounds): Tunisia presidential (all 5 years old: nov-dec, src1, src2)

2019? : regional reports Tunisia (report 30 October 2016 src1, src2, infosfuture, src26.3.17, report 26.3.17 src25.7.16, src10.1.17, src2018?, src, src17.12.17, report 17.12.17, src, src2maynear, at least 2 months after local 6.5.18)

2019: legislative Mauritius and election of the head of government (prime minister) by the parliament (every 5 years, December at the latest?)

2019: local Tanzania (civic election for Streets or Villages Chairman’s, every 5 years: December? – by-elections were held on 12.8.18, src, reactionUSA / violence and irregularities, CP-USA)

2019 at the latest: local Niger (source10.8.15, report 9.5.16 to 10.7.16, then report 8.1.17, source, source2, carryover from 2017 to 2019, source1, source2)

2019? : local / regional, municipal and rural Senegal (every 5 years, June?, source)

 

* * * Uncertain elections for 2019, 2020, … * * *

2019? : Guinea-Bissau presidential election (every 5 years: April?, postponed after the March elections)

2019? : presidential Libya (postponed before 23.10.11 + 22 months = June 2013, report 2015, src, AccordParis290518), report 10.12.18, src)

2019? : Libya legislative (report before 23.10.11 + 22 months = June 2013, report 2015, src, AccordParis290518)

2019? : local / municipal Egypt (postponed 2016, 2017-2018, for after presidential may 2018?)

2019, 2020? : local Togo (carried over from 2014, 2016, 2017 and 2018, with legislative elections in July 2018?, source-July2018, source-dec2018, no local since 1987 despite the 1992 Constitution, municipalities headed by special delegations appointed by presidential decree, required by opposition)

 

  • RDC 3 polls scheduled and postponed according to agreement of 31.12.17:

2019, 2020 …? : local elections DRCongo (municipal councilors, sector councilors and chieftainship) (report 2.15, 2.13, and 2013, src1, src2, src3, and 26.05.16 + 15.06.15 + 29.08.15, src13.2.15, src, report of the 25 October 2015, postponed beyond December 2017 according to the agreement of 31.12.17)

2019, 2020 …? : urban, local and local indirect elections DRCongo (urban councilors, bourgmestres and sector chiefs by indirect suffrage, src) (report of ’20 .1 + 7.3.16 ‘, postponement beyond December 2017 according to agreement of 31.12.17 )

2019, 2020 …? : Senate elections DRCongo by indirect vote (elected to the second degree by the provincial deputies) (Report of ’13 -17.1.16 ‘, postponement of 5.6.13, src1, report 2014 src2, src13.2.15, indirect voting, again postponed , src, postponed beyond December 2017 according to the agreement of 31.12.17)

 

 

C.    Reminder : provisional calendar of the elections of the study of 14.1.18

 

Summary 2018 (summary of Annex B) : Presidential and Legislative
25 elections (without Libya) :
– 8 presidential
– 17 legislative
– 9 electoral processes in a democratic framework
– 16 electoral processes in a non-democratic framework (in bold below)

 

Calendar of Elections in Africa from January 1st, 2018 to December 31st, 2022 – As of January 14, 2018
Prediction of electoral processes between 2017 and 2022 according to the presence or absence of democracy
[8]

Democratic

electoral processes **

Electoral processes

in a non-democratic regime

Total
Presidential Legislative Total Présidential Legislative Total Pres. Leg. Tot.
2017 3+2* 6 9+2* 1+1* 4 5+1* 4+3* 10 14+3*
2018 3 6 9 5 10 15 8 16 24
2019 7+3* 9 16+3* 3 2 5 10+3* 11 21+3*
2020 5 4 9 5 5 10 10 9 19
2021 6+1* 6 12+1* 4 2 6 10+1* 8 18+1*
2022 2+1* 5 7+1* 1+1* 4 5+1* 3+2* 9 12+2*
Total 26+7* 36 62+7* 19+2* 27 46+2* 45+9* 63 108+9*

*: Election Head of State by Parliament **: Including in country in unstable regime, following war, and in real transition to democracy.

 

February 23, 2018: Legislative Djibouti
March 7, 2018: presidential Sierra Leone
March 7, 2018: Legislative Sierra Leone
24 to 26 March and 24 to 26 April 2018: Presidential Egypt
2018: Legislative Gabon (April?)

May 2018: legislative Guinea Bissau (every 4 years: April?)
2018: Togo legislative (every 5 years: July?)
2018: Zimbabwe legislations (every 5 years: July?)
2018: Zimbabwe presidential (every 5 years: July?)
2018: Mali presidential (every 5 years: July-August?)
2018: Guinea C legislative (every 5 years: September?)
2018: Rwanda legislative (every 5 years: September?)
2018: pseudo-legislative Swaziland (every 5 years: September?)
2018: legislative Cameroon (every 5 years: September?)
2018: Cameroon presidential election (every 7 years: October?)
2018: legislative Sao Tome and Principe (every 4 years: October?)
2018: Madagascar legislative (every 5 years: Oct-Dec?)
2018: Madagascar presidential election (every 5 years: Oct-Dec?)
2018: Mali legislative elections (every 5 years: November?)
2018: Legislative Mauritania (every 5 years: Nov-Dec?)
December 23, 2017: Congo Kinshasa presidential election
December 23, 2017: legislative Congo Kinshasa
Very uncertain for 2018:
2018? : South Sudan presidential
2018? : South Sudan legislative
NB: Probably in 2019 (counted in 2019):
2018, 2019? : presidential Libya (report 2013, 2015)

 

*** Footnotes ***

[1] https://regardexcentrique.wordpress.com/2017/04/27/democratisation-de-lafrique-cartes-de-1989-a-2017-extrait-de-letude-du-27-4-17/#jp-carousel-6201

[2] https://regardexcentrique.wordpress.com/2018/01/14/democraties-et-dictatures-en-afrique-bilan-2017-et-perspectives-2018/

[3] https://regardexcentrique.wordpress.com/2017/04/27/democratisation-de-lafrique-cartes-de-1989-a-2017-extrait-de-letude-du-27-4-17/

[4] R.Marzin, 1.2 https://regardexcentrique.wordpress.com/2018/04/12/processus-electoraux-en-afrique-synthese-technique-et-politique-resume/, 6.5.2 30.3.16 : https://regardexcentrique.wordpress.com/2016/03/30/apres-26-ans-de-democratisation-dictature-et-democratie-bientot-a-lequilibre-en-afrique/, Exceptions 3.5 27.4.17 : https://regardexcentrique.wordpress.com/2017/04/27/2016-annee-des-coups-detat-electoraux-en-afrique-et-democratisation-de-lafrique-depuis-1990/#_Toc481083399

[5] Régis Marzin, 21.11.17,  https://regardexcentrique.wordpress.com/2012/08/04/calendrier-des-elections-en-afrique/#3

[6] Note of 14.1.18 : When there are several possibilities considered, is noted, in table below, the most probable, and, in stable dictatorship most often the most negative, and, in a most positive democracy. In TCII, in case of absence forecast, category noted is that intermediate, ‘doubtfull’.

[7] Régis Marzin, 21.11.17,  https://regardexcentrique.wordpress.com/2012/08/04/calendrier-des-elections-en-afrique/#3

[8] Régis Marzin, 21.11.17,  https://regardexcentrique.wordpress.com/2012/08/04/calendrier-des-elections-en-afrique/#3

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